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The Supreme Court and Tying
Arrangements: Antitrust as History
Victor H. Kramer*
[P]olicy about industrial structure and conduct must be placed in its
historical context in order to be fully understood.1
The current debate between two schools of thought con-
cerning the legitimate objectives of antitrust law rivals some of
the debates about the world's great religions. One group, fre-
quently dubbed the "Chicago School,"2 asserts that the exclu-
sive goal of antitrust law should be to achieve "allocative
efficiency," broadly defined as the production of the greatest
amount of goods at the lowest cost.3 This group favors selective
application of the antitrust laws,4 arguing that competitors in a
* Law Alumni Professor, University of Minnesota Law School The au-
thor wishes to thank Patricia Dobberstein, J.D. 1985, University of Minnesota,
and Solveig Kramer, M.S.L.S. 1973, Catholic University, for their invaluable
editorial and research assistance; Abe Krash, Esq. and the law firm of Arnold
& Porter for making their Washington, D.C., facilities available in the prepara-
tion of this Article; and Merrick Garland and Professor Leo Raskind for read-
ing drafts and making helpful suggestions. I also wish to thank Professor
Richard Craswell for his inciteful observations in a letter to me about the
Supreme Court's opinions in Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde
1. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRusT § 2, at 12 (1977).
2. The label derives from the group's identification with the University
of Chicago. For example, Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, one of the
foremost members of this group, is a former professor at the law school of the
University of Chicago.
3. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 90-106 (1978); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 176-90 (3d ed. 1966).
See generally H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw 40-49
(1985) (summarizing efficiency model of Chicago School); Rowe, The Decline
of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Eco-
nomics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1512 n.4 (1984) (compiling articles representative of
the Chicago School).
4. On the one hand, many members of the group would interpret anti-
trust laws to outlaw cartels engaging in price fixing or allocation of markets
and would permit restructuring of businesses in the relatively rare cases of
genuine monopolization. See, e-g., R. BORK, supra note 3, at 69-71; R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTrvE 22 (1976) ("Fortunately, since
few economists believe that collusive pricing generates significant economic
gains, when a practice has been correctly identified as a form of collusion we
can generally suppress it without misgivings."). See generally D. AubmNTANo,
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free market invariably choose the most efficient way of doing
business.5 In contrast, opponents of the Chicago School con-
tend that the goal of antitrust law should be to prevent exces-
sive concentrations of economic and political power in large
capital combinations.6 This group therefore asserts that anti-
trust laws should be applied to maintain and encourage the cre-
ation of relatively small business units by preserving
competitors, even if such preservation produces no demonstr-
able benefit for consumers.7
Despite the fervor of the debate, its intellectual founda-
tions are not new. The roots of today's conflicting ideologies
were evident in the Supreme Court's early antitrust opinions,8
as well as in the writings of distinguished economists of the
nineteenth century.9 This Article traces the debate through an
ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE 274 (1981) (ob-
serving that some critics of antitrust "have strongly endorsed antitrust en-
forcement in the price-fixing and market division area"). But see id. at 275
("To attempt to prohibit certain merger agreements or price-fixing agreements
in the name of enhancing social efficiency is a contradiction in terms. Such
agreements are efficient since they represent explicit evidence of social coordi-
nation."). On the other hand, the members of the Chicago School generally
oppose restructuring businesses in other contexts and the condemnation of
long-accepted business practices. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 3, at 175-91; R.
POSNER, supra, at 78-95 (suggesting that in most instances, deconcentration of
businesses could impose substantial costs on society); authorities cited inAfra
note 5.
5. See, e.g., D. ARMENTANO, supra note 4, at 29-30; R. BORK, supra note 3,
at 20-21; see also Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 165 (1984) ("The most reasonable interpretation of a
persistent practice is that the practice is persistently beneficial to consum-
ers."). It can be assumed that Judge Easterbrook did not intend to include the
"persistent practice" of price fixing within his generalization. See supra note
4. See generally Rowe, supra note 3, at 1548 (describing how the assumption
that free markets benefit consumers by ensuring an efficient allocation of re-
sources leads the Chicago School to conclude that concentrated industries, ver-
tical integration, mergers, conglomeration, and sometimes even price fixing
are efficient and therefore should be permitted).
6. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 422-24 (1970); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, § 1, at 3-5. See gener-
ally H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 40-49; A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A STUDY OF COMPETITION ENFORCED BY
LAW 427-32 (2d ed. 1970) (suggesting that the antitrust laws reflect political
radicalism, the interests of "small business," and the goal of competition in
open markets); R. Hofstader, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in
THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1965).
7. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 40-49; L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 1, § 1, at 4-5.
8. See infra notes 59-119 and accompanying text.
9. Many of the present themes of the Chicago School, for example, were
voiced by influential economists of the late 1880's in opposition to § 1 of the
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examination of the Supreme Court's application of antitrust
laws to tying arrangements.10 Part I discusses the early judicial
history of tying arrangements and the legislative response that
ultimately resulted in section 3 of the Clayton Act." Part H
examines antitrust challenges to tying arrangements that have
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982)), then under consideration by Congress. Professor Arthur T.
Hadley, later President of Yale, wrote in 1887:
[Clompetition ends in combination. [Competition] cannot exist indef-
initely without ruin to the investor.... [The chance for the small
independent business man is less. If the competition does not crush
him down, the combination swallows him up.
This monopoly, due to the advantages of large organizations of
capital, is characteristic of the present day.
... [1In those lines of industry which involve large capital, under
concentrated management, the old theory of free competition is as un-
tenable as it was in the case of railroads. That a great deal of our pro-
ductive industry is thus monopolized hardly admits of doubt.
Hadley, Private Monopolies and Public Rights, 1 QJ. ECON. 28, 40-41 (1886).
Writing in the same year, Professor Edwin R.A. Seligman of Columbia
said: "However the railways start out, they are sure to end in combina-
tion.... In no business are the effects of spasmodic competition more perni-
cious." Seligman, Railway Tariffs and the Interstate Commerce Law, 2 PoL.
SC. Q. 369, 375 (1887).
George Gunton wrote the following year that "[d]uring the last ten years
[Standard Oil] has had practically no competitor. Still the price of oil has
steadily tended downwards." Gunton, The Economic and Social Aspect of
Trusts, 3 PoL SCI. Q. 385, 403 n.1 (1888). Gunton insisted that the trusts have
"a direct interest in keeping prices at least sufficiently low not to invite the
organization of counter enterprises which may destroy their existing profits."
See id- at 403. Gunton also predicted that the charge that trusts "are obtaining
an increasing control over the government, and are thereby tending to become
... political dictators... will also prove to be unfounded." See id. at 403.
By 1901, John Bates Clark, the dean of United States economists, wrote
that "the trusts... are here to stay and we know it" See J. CLARK, THE CON.
TROL OF TRUSTS 18 (1901).
Some of the themes of today's opponents to the Chicago School can also
be found in economic studies of the late nineteenth century. But cf. F.
SCHERER, supra note 6, at 424 ("About the only group in America other than
big businessmen outspokenly unconcerned about the trust problem were the
professional economists.... They saw the growth of big business as a natural
evolutionary response consistent with economies of scale, or when scale econo-
mies were patently absent from mergers, as a step necessary to eliminate cut-
throat competition."). See generally W. LErviN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY
IN AMERICA 71-77 (1965) (surveying the views of economists of the late nine-
teenth century).
10. A tying arrangement exists, for example, when a seller conditions the
sale of one commodity, or "tying" product, on the purchase of another com-
modity, or "tied product." Such tying arrangements can also be achieved
through leases, rather than sales, and the tying or tied products can be serv-
ices, rather than commodities.
1L Ch. 723, § 3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (current version at 15 US.C. § 14 (1982)).
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been presented to the Supreme Court and explores the possible
reasons for the shifting theoretical bases of the decisions. Part
III reviews the Supreme Court's most recent decision on tying
arrangements, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde,' 2 notes the sharp ideological differences between the ma-
jority and concurring opinions, and discusses the conceptual
and analytical flaws of both.
I. THE EARLY HISTORY OF TYING
ARRANGEMENTS, 1896-1914
The principal tool of antitrust enforcement is, of course,
section 1 of the Sherman Act, which declares that "[e]very con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is [hereby] declared to be illegal."'13
Section 1 has rarely been read as broadly as its "every contract"
language would suggest.14 In the last decade of the nineteenth
and the first decade of the twentieth centuries, the language
was not thought adequate to prevent even those tying arrange-
ments in which patentees sought to expand their legal monopo-
lies by tying the patented products to nonpatented goods or
services. In the germinal case of Heaton-Peninsular Button-
Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.,' 5 the Sixth Circuit held in
an opinion by Judge Horace Lurton that a patent carried with
it the right to condition sale of the patented machine on the
purchaser's agreement to use only the patentee's nonpatented
goods with the machine.16 Although Judge Lurton recognized
that the patentee's right to limit the use of the patented prod-
uct was, like all property rights, subject to the general law of
the land,17 the court never specified what such constraining
laws might be and, significantly, never mentioned the six-year-
old Sherman Act.
12. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
13. Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)) (brackets in-
dicate language omitted from U.S.C.).
14. Strictly construed, § 1 could be interpreted to invalidate all contracts
because all contracts "restrain" trade to a certain extent. Although enforcing
the "plain meaning" of the statute received some early judicial support, see
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-28 (1897), the
Sherman Act has never been extended as far as its language would conceiva-
bly allow.
15. 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
16. See id at 292. Coincidentally, the machine in question was used to
fasten buttons to shoes. See id at 295-96.
17. See id at 293.
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nority overcame its "reluctance to dissent"2 6 to "make it clear
that if evils arise their continuance will not be caused by the
interpretation now given to the statute, but will result from the
inaction of the legislative department in failing to amend the
statute so as to avoid such evils."27
Concern about the Sherman Act's apparent inability to
reach tying arrangements was augmented by a general dissatis-
faction about Supreme Court applications of the Act in other
contexts.28 The 1912 National Platform of the Democratic
Party stated: "We regret that the Sherman Anti-Trust Law has
received a judicial construction depriving it of much of its effi-
ciency, and we favor the enactment of legislation which will re-
store to the statute the strength of which it has been deprived
by such interpretations."29 In the same year, the Democrats
succeeded in having their candidate, Woodrow Wilson, elected
President of the United States.
On January 20, 1914, President Wilson urged a joint session
of Congress to adopt additional antitrust legislation. 3° Wilson
26. See id- at 49 (White, C.J., joined by Hughes and Lamar, JJ.,
dissenting).
27. See i. at 50 (White, C.J., joined by Hughes and Lamar, JJ., dissent-
ing).
In United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913), another pre-Clayton Act
case, three separate groups of individuals, each controlling a different group of
patented machines used in making shoes, formed into a combination, the
United Shoe Machinery Co., that controlled between 70 and 80% of the market
for their machines. Id at 203 (argument for the United States); i& at 215-16
(opinion of the Court). The defendants then leased their machines on the con-
dition that shoe manufacturers use only machines furnished by the combina-
tion. d. at 216 (opinion of the Court). The defendants were charged with a
criminal violation of the Sherman Act, see i&, and the Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Holmes, held that the combination was not unlawful, see i&
at 216-17. Although the validity of the tying arrangements was not directly
before the Court, Justice Holmes observed in passing that "[t]he machines are
patented, making them is a monopoly in any case, the exclusion of competitors
from the use of them is of the very essence of the right conferred by the pat-
ents .... and it may be assumed that the success of the several groups was due
to their patents having been the best." See id. at 216 (citation omitted). The
Court did not cite A.B. Dick or Button-Fastener.
28. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), the Supreme Court inter-
preted the Sherman Act in "the light of reason." The Court's adoption of a
rule of reason led some to decry the weakening of the Sherman Act and
others to protest against its potentially broad scope. See Levy, The Clayton
Law-An Imperfect Supplement to the Sherman Law, 3 VA. L REv. 411, 414-16
(1916).
29. Levy, supra note 28, at 414-15.




sought the establishment of a "trade commission" that would
give "advice, ... definite guidance and information" to busi-
nesses,31 as well as the enactment of a statute designed to "ex-
plicitly" forbid, "item by item . . . in such terms as will
practically eliminate uncertainty, '32 specified monopolistic
practices not clearly unlawful under the Sherman Act.33
Within nine months of the address, Congress enacted both the
Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act.34 Section
3 of the Clayton Act specifically applies to tying arrangements,
stating:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for
sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-
modities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption or re-
sale within the United States .... or fix a price charged therefor, or
discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement
or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or
deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller,
where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condi-
tion, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
35
Section 3 represented a late compromise between the op-
posing views of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
As originally adopted by the House, section 4 of the bill
criminalized all exclusive dealing, including tying arrange-
ments, involving goods (as distinguished from services).36 The
Senate, however, struck section 4 from the bill.37 The legisla-
31. See id at 1963.
32. See ia.
33. President Wilson's message outlined a number of provisions for inclu-
sion in the statute, such as the prohibition of interlocking directorates, penal-
ties for corporate officers who were responsible for antitrust law violations of
their corporations, prohibition of holding companies, and tolling of the statute
of limitations for the benefit of private antitrust plaintiffs. See id. at 1963-64.
The President did not mention either exclusive dealing or tying arrangements.
34. The Federal Trade Commission Act was signed by the President on
September 26, 1914. See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No.
63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982)). The
Clayton Act was signed on October 15, 1914. See Clayton Act of 1914, Pub. L.
No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
35. Clayton Act, ch. 723, § 3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1982)).
36. See H.R. 15,657, § 4, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), reprinted in 2 THE LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES
1729 (E. Kintner ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
37. See 51 CONG. REc. 13,849 (1914) (deleting § 4); id. at 14,271-73
(amended version of § 4 deleted); H.R. 15,675, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) (as
1020 [Vol. 69:1013
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tive history of the Clayton Act indicates that many senators ob-
jected to the section as unnecessary, apparently believing that
the newly established Federal Trade Commission could better
determine which exclusive dealing arrangements should be un-
lawful and could respond accordingly under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act'sns broad prohibition of "unfair
methods of competition."3 9 Other senators objected to the
breadth of the bill. For example, during the debates, Senator
Cummins remarked:
If this section prohibited only the tying in of articles, I would be
warmly and heartily for it, but it prohibits other transactions (as
well].
... The manufacturer of Quaker Oats has acquired a great domi-
nance in the trade.... The small competitor comes into the field de-
siring to introduce exactly the same thing ... and calls it Rolled
Oats. The only way in which he can make progress against his com-
petitor is to secure a dealer... [to whom] he says, "If you will take
my product, Rolled Oats, and agree not to sell the Quaker Oats...
you shall have the exclusive privilege of selling it in this community,
and you can make . .. a campaign for its introduction." I say that
that transaction is not only an innocent one, but I think it is necessary
in order to preserve competition among the manufacturers of the
productf4°
As indicated by Senator Cummins, some senators agreed
with the House that certain tying arrangements should be pro-
hibited outright and not left to the Trade Commission's discre-
tion. The tying arrangements employed by the United Shoe
Machinery Company received particular congressional condem-
nation.4 ' United Shoe leased its patented shoe machinery on
the condition that the lessee could not use the machinery to
make shoes on which other work had been performed by a
amended and passed by the Senate), reprinted in 3 LEGiSLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 36, at 2424-25.
38. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719-21 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)).
39. Id. at 719; see Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors
in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the
Clayton Ac4 65 HARV. L. REV. 913, 934 (1952); McAllister, Where the Effect
May Be to Substantially Lessen Competition or Tend to Create a Monopoly, 2
A.B.A. SEc. ATrIRUST L 124, 125-26 (1953).
40. 51 CONG. REc. 14,253 (1914) (statement of Sen. Cummins).
41. Reference to the tying arrangements of United Shoe Machinery dur-
ing the congressional debates on the Clayton Act are extensive. See, eg., H.
REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIS.
TORY, supra note 36, at 1089, 1094; 51 CONG. REc. 15,990-91 (1914) (statement of




machine not leased from United Shoe.42 In December 1911, the
government had filed a Sherman Act suit attacking these lease
provisions.43 Barely three months later, the Supreme Court
handed down its holding in A.B. Dick.44
Fear of A.B. Dick's impact led some senators to urge rein-
statement of the House provision outlawing tying arrange-
ments. Senator Reed, for example, contended that A.B. Dick
would "deprive the purchasing public of the advantages of...
free use" of patented articles if not legislatively overruled.45
He asserted that Chief Justice White's dissenting opinion in
A.B. Dick was "a direct challenge to Congress to remedy this
evil" 46 and that unless Congress acted, "it will be but a short
time" until "every kind of restraint of trade will be protected
by a [tying] clause. '47
On August 26, 1914, the Senate agreed to an amendment
prohibiting tying clauses in connection with patented prod-
ucts, 4 8 thus overruling the A.B. Dick decision.4 9 Nevertheless,
the legislation went to the conference committee with a wide
difference of opinion between the House and the Senate on all
other aspects of exclusive dealing. For nearly three weeks, the
various factions battled over the section.50 Finally, a compro-
42. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 59-60 (1918).
43. See THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS WITH SUMMARY OF CASES INSTI-
TUTED BY THE UNITED STATES 1891-1951, at 92 (CCH 1952) (case 101) [hereinaf-
ter cited as FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS]. For a description of additional tying
clauses in United Shoe's leases, see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co.,
247 U.S. 32, 61-63 (1918).
44. 224 U.S. 1 (1912); see supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
45. See 51 CONG. REc. 14,091 (1914) (statement of Sen. Reed).
46. See id at 14,092 (statement of Sen. Reed).
47. See id at 14,095 (statement of Sen. Reed).
48. See id. at 14,273-76. Section 4, as adopted by the Senate, provided, in
part:
That it shall not be lawful to insert a condition in any contract
relating to the sale or lease of or license to use any article or process
protected by a patent or patents the effect of which will be to prohibit
or restrict the purchaser, lessee, or licensee from using any article or
class of articles, whether patented or not, or any patented process,
supplied or owned by any person other than the seller, lessor, or li-
censor, or his nominees, or the effect of which will be to require the
purchaser, lessee, or licensee to acquire from the seller, lessor, or 11-
censor, or his nominees any article or class of articles not protected by
the patent; and any such conditions, whether heretofore or hereafter
made, shall be null and void, as being in restraint of trade and con-
trary to public policy. ...
Id. at 14,275.
49. See Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 39, at 934 n.63.
50. See 51 CONG. REC. 16,273 (1914) (statement of Rep. Webb).
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mise was reached, and both the Senate and the House adopted
the new section 3, which made exclusive dealing arrangements
unlawful when their effect "may be to substantially lessen com-
petition."51 The criminal sanctions were dropped entirelya
In one respect, the congressional intent underlying section
3 seems reasonably clear: to condemn tying arrangements in
which the tying product is patented.93 Thus, section 3 was
designed to ensure that United Shoe's tying arrangements
would be unlawful under the Clayton Act regardless of the out-
come of the pending Sherman Act challenge.s4 In other con-
texts, however, the compromise between the House and the
Senate did not clarify the law of tying arrangements, but in-
stead dumped on the courts the responsibility for determining
which arrangements were lawful and which were to be con-
demned because they "may . . . substantially lessen
competition."55
51. See I-R. REP. No. 1168, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1914), reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 36, at 2456, 2457.
52. See id.; supra text accompanying note 35.
53. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text; rf Jefferson Parish
Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1557 (1984) ("In enacting Section 3
of the Clayton Act,... Congress expressed great concern about the anticom-
petitive character of tying arrangements.") (citing HI.R. REP. No. 627, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 10-13 (1914); SEN. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-9 (1914)).
The accompanying footnote in Hyde contains numerous citations to the con-
gressional debates in support of this proposition. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1557
n.15; see also Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 39, at 934-35 (describing the com-
petitive impact clause that was adopted by the conference committee as "un-
doubtedly the expression of the necessary compromise between the House and
the Senate. This compromise was made necessary by the conviction of the ma-
jority of the Senate that not all exclusive arrangements adversely affect com-
petition, and some should be permitted or even encouraged as helpful to
competition. In the compromise, the Senate abandoned its insistence that only
the FTC should exercise jurisdiction over exclusive arrangements, but by the
competitive impact clause gained its point that discretion should be exercised
by both the courts and the Commission in applying the Act.") (footnote
omitted).
54. See McAllister, supra note 39, at 131-32 ("It is evident from the com-
mittee reports and debates on the floor that Congress was aiming this blow at
the employment of exclusive dealing by established firms whose strength al-
ready verged on monopoly and not at smaller firms using it to cut down en-
trenched competitors.") (footnote omitted); supra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text.
55. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). As one commentator observed-
From this legislative history, it seems clear that the competitive
impact clause compromise was also designed to prescribe the stan-
dard--difficult to apply though it be-for the courts to use in exercis-
ing that discretion. That standard is to appraise whether the effect
"may" be to substantially lessen competition. The foregoing economic
analysis demonstrates that the quantity or share of commerce affected
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
II. SUPREME COURT CASES ON TYING
ARRANGEMENTS, 1917-1977
Statutes cannot be applied without interpretation of their
language, and legislators rarely draft a statute with perfect
clarity. Statutory phrases such as "may ... substantially
lessen competition"56 and legislators' use of words such as
"great and powerful" or "independent"57 must be translated
into more concrete concepts before they can be applied with
any precision. It has essentially been through this process of
translation that the Supreme Court has developed the antitrust
law of tying arrangements.5 8 The various translations adopted
by the Court since the adoption of the Clayton Act reflect the
shifting judicial attitudes regarding the boundaries of legitimate
antitrust enforcement.
The initial tying cases to reach the Supreme Court after
the passage of section 3 reveal that the attitudes of the Court's
members on antitrust enforcement were divided much like
those of the participants in the current debate about antitrust
goals. The first post-Clayton Act case heard by the Supreme
Court was the 1917 case of Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Uni-
versal Film Manufacturing Co.,59 the facts of which were simi-
lar to those in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. 60 In Motion Picture
Patents, the plaintiff held a patent conferring a legal monopoly
on the sale of motion-picture projectors. By attaching a notice
to the projectors, plaintiff required that only its affiliates' films
could be used with the projectors.6' The suit arose as an in-
is not by itself a safe guide to the effect of exclusive arrangements on
competition ...
... The qualifying clause must have been designed, as the legis-
lative history indicates, to require consideration of other economic
factors in appraising the overall effect upon competition.
Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 39, at 935; see also McAllister, supra note 39, at
131 ("[The Senate] agreed to the more general prohibitions only on the under-
standing, in the final compromise, that the beneficial uses of the practice
would be saved by the qualifying clause.") (footnote omitted). See generally R.
BORK, supra note 3, at 72 ("The process of antitrust lawmaking has largely
been confined to the judiciary.").
56. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
57. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 36, at 1089, 1094.
58. See infra notes 59-281 and accompanying text.
59. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
60. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
61. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 506-07; Spivack, The Chicago
School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of Monopoly Power: A Response, 52
ANTrrRUST L.J. 651, 664 (1983).
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fringement action against three defendants for using or supply-
ing for use film not made by the plaintiff.6a The court of
appeals found that the plaintiffs restrictions violated section 3
of the Clayton Act and were therefore unenforceable6a The
Supreme Court affirmed but based its decision on public policy
grounds rather than on section 3.
The opinion in Motion Picture Patents was written by Jus-
tice Clarke; Justices McKenna, Holmes, and Van Devanter dis-
sented. Justice Clarke was an ardent Wilsonian Democrat64
and an idealist65 His opinions reveal a populist's objections to
big business.6 Thus, in describing the effect of the tying
62. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 505.
63. Judge Augustus Hand wrote: "If the prohibitions of the Clayton Act
mean anything at all, this case falls within them, and the restrictions... are
therefore void. Indeed, the report of the judiciary committee of the House
concerning the Clayton Act shows that its purpose is to reach the film monop-
oly." Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 235 F. 398, 400-01
(2d Cir. 1916) (referring to ILR. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914)),
affd, 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
64. Justice Clarke was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Wil-
son in 1916. Burner, John H. Clarke, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNiTED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEm LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2077, 2081 (L.
Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICES]. (Volume 5 of
JUSTICES was published in 1978 and was edited by Leon Friedman.) According
to one biography of Justice Brandeis, "It seems not unlikely that Brandeis
may have suggested Clarke's name to President Wilson." A. MASON, BRAN.
DEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 513 nt (1946).
65. Justice Clarke is the only Supreme Court Justice to resign in order to
pursue a crusade: promoting the entrance of the United States into the
League of Nations. At the time of Justice Clarke's resignation, he wrote to
Louis Brandeis:
I should die happier... if I should do all that is possible to promote
the entrance of our government into the League of Nations than if I
continued to devote my time to determining whether a drunken In-
dian had been deprived of his land before he died or whether the dig-
ging of a ditch in Iowa was constitutional or not.
Letter from John H. Clarke to Louis Brandeis (Sept 13, 1922), quoted in A.
MASON, supra note 64, at 536. A biographer of Clarke adds dryly that Clarke
"apparently underestimated his importance on the Court as much as he over-
estimated the political chances of the League." Burner, John H Clarke, in 3
JUSTICES, supr note 64, at 2077, 2085. Indeed, Justice Clarke's resignation was
a monumental miscalculation because President Harding replaced Clarke with
Senator George Sutherland, a conservative Republican. See Burner, George
Sutherland, in 3 JUSTICES, supra note 64, at 2133, 2135-37. If Clarke had re-
mained on the bench (he lived until 1945), a whole series of important five-to-
four decisions might have gone the other way. See, eg., Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S.
330 (1935); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (5-3 decision;
Brandeis, J., did not participate).
66. Justice Clarke wrote the opinions for the Court in United States v.
Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Lehigh Valley RH. Co., 254
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clauses in Motion Picture Patents, he stated:
The perfect instrument of favoritism and oppression which such a sys-
tem of doing business, if valid, would put into the control of the
owner of such a patent should make courts astute, if need be, to de-
feat its operation. If these restrictions were sustained plainly the
plaintiff might, for its own profit or that of its favorites, by the obvi-
ously simple expedient of varying its royalty charge, ruin anyone un-
fortunate enough to be dependent upon its confessedly important
improvements for the doing of business.
67
The majority thus affirmed dismissal of the infringement suit
and explicitly overruled A.B. Dick.68
The government's appeal of its Sherman Act civil suit
against the United Shoe Machinery Company was scheduled to
be argued one month after the Court's decision in Motion Pic-
ture Patents. The pendency of this suit explains the Court's
specific reference to the Clayton Act in Motion Picture Patents:
Our conclusion renders it unnecessary to make the application of
[the Clayton Act] to the case at bar which the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals made of it but it must be accepted by us as a most persuasive
expression of the public policy of our country with respect to the
question before us.
69
This reference appears to be a deliberate effort by Justice
Clarke to anticipate one issue arising in the appeal against
U.S. 255 (1920); and American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257
U.S. 377 (1921). In each of these cases, the Court upheld the government's po-
sition. The Reading and Lehigh Valley cases involved corporate combinations
alleged to be in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The American Column
case involved an exchange among competitors of statistical information by a
trade association, the effect of which, the government asserted, was to limit
competition in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
It is interesting to note that Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, in a personal
letter, described Clarke's dissent in United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S.
268 (1922), as "sentiment and rhetoric." See Letter from Oliver Wendall
Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 26, 1922), reprinted in 1 HoLMES-LAsKI LET-
TERS 413 (M. Howe ed. 1953); see also Letter from Oliver Wendall Holmes to
Sir Frederick Pollock (Mar. 29, 1922) ("My brother Clarke uttered a
larmoyant dissent [in Britt] that seemed to me more sentiment and rhetoric
than reasoning . . . ."), reprinted in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETERs 92 (M.
Howe 2d ed. 1961). In Britt, the Court reversed the lower courts, which had
found for plaintiff, in a case brought on behalf of two children, ages 8 and 11,
who had entered a pool of water on private property near a "travelled way"
that looked pure but was poisoned with abandoned chemicals. The Court held
that a landowner owes no duty to keep the land safe for young children unless
the landowner has invited them onto the land. See Britt, 258 U.S. at 275-76.
67. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 515.
68. See id. at 518-19; see also United States v. Motion Picture Patent Corp.,
225 F. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1915) (holding that Motion Picture Patent Co. had entered
into a combination in violation of the Sherman Act), appeal dismissed, 247
U.S. 524 (1918).
69. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 517-18.
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United Shoe Machinery-a decision in which two of the five
justices joining the majority opinion in Motion Picture Patents
would be forced to disqualify themselves.70
Justice Clarke's attempt to predetermine the outcome of
the decision in United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Co. (United Shoe 1) failed, however. In a four-to-three decision,
the Court upheld the leases' now-infamous tying clauses, with
Justice McKenna, who had dissented in Motion Picture Pat-
ents, writing for the controlling plurality.7 In contrast to the
judicial philosophy reflected in Justice Clarke's opinions, Jus-
tice McKenna's opinion indicates a belief that government
should leave markets alone, even markets showing strong ten-
dencies toward monopoly, in order to maintain efficiency 2 His
70. Justice Brandeis not only had been counsel for the defendant, he sub-
sequently had opposed the defendant's practices and worked toward the pas-
sage of the Clayton Act. See A. MAsON, supra note 64, at 214-29, 407-08.
Justice McReynolds had been President Wilson's attorney general for part of
the time the case was pending in the courts. McReynolds was attorney general
from March 1913 to October 1914. See 230 U.S. iii (1913); 235 U.S. ii (1914).
United Shoe Machinery was commenced on December 12, 1911. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
71. 247 U.S. 32 (1918). Chief Justice White, who had been in the majority
in Motion Picture Patents, switched his vote in United Shoe I and voted with
the plurality, thus changing the result.
72. Justice McKenna was appointed to the Supreme Court at the age of 54
by Republican President McKinley in 1897, and he joined the Court in early
1898. During his 27-year tenure, Justice McKenna wrote four opinions for the
Court and one dissenting opinion in government antitrust cases. See Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912); United States v. Pacific
& Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918); United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214, 242 (1922)
(McKenna, J., dissenting). In United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251
U.S. 417 (1920), brought under the Sherman Act, the government charged that
the corporation had created a combination in restraint of trade by acquiring
competing steel producers that together produced more than half of the iron
and steel in the country. See id at 438-39. The government also alleged that
the steel corporation had entered into agreements with its remaining competi-
tors to fix market prices. The Court, split four-to-three with Justice McKenna
writing the opinion of the Court, held that the combination was not illegal and
that the alleged cartel agreement was based on stale facts because the so-called
Gary dinners, at which prices were discussed, had been abandoned before the
case reached the courts.
Justice McKenna's only dissenting opinion in a government antitrust case
came in United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922), in which he
was the lone dissenter. The case involved control over the Central Pacific by
the Southern Pacific, which the government attacked as a combination in re-
straint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court upheld the govern-
ment's position. McKenna's dissent was strong, almost bitter, arguing that the
combination contributed to "efficiency." See Southern Pac, 259 U.S. at 245
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opinion largely ignored the policy reasons cited in Motion Pic-
ture Patents and instead distinguished the decision as one in-
volving a sale in which the patentee attempted to "grant the
title [to the patented good] and retain the incidents of it."7 3
United Shoe Machinery, however, merely leased the patented
article and thus could condition the right of others to use it.74
The Court's conclusion validated United Shoe's status and con-
duct through "efficiency" arguments and evoked nineteenth-
century laissez faire economics. Justice McKenna wrote: "The
company, indeed, has magnitude, but it is at once the result and
cause of efficiency, and the charge that it has been oppressively
used is not sustained. ' 75 Justice McKenna asserted that not
every restraint of trade violated the Sherman Act: "Of course,
there is restraint in a patent .... This strength is the compen-
sation which the law grants for the exercise of invention. ' ' 76 In-
stead, any harmful effect of the tying clauses was bargained for
by the lessees:
We must assume [the tying clauses] were entered into by the lessees
upon a calculation of their value-the efficiency of the machines bal-
anced against the restrictions upon and conditions of their use. The
lessees had the alternative of the choice of other machines ....
. .. [T]he leases are simply bargains, not different from others,
moved upon calculated considerations, and, whether provident or im-
provident, are entitled nevertheless to the sanctions of the law.
7 7
The rule of United Shoe I, therefore, was that tying arrange-
ments were lawful under the Sherman Act.
Justices Clarke and Day both wrote separate dissents in
(McKenna, J., dissenting). Curiously, his views prevailed in the end. The di-
vestiture order did not prevent the Southern Pacific from applying to the In-
terstate Commerce Commission to acquire control of the Central Pacific. The
Commission found such control to be in the public interest, and the Commis-
sion was upheld in the district court by a three-judge panel that included
Judge Sanborn. See United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 290 F. 443 (D. Utah
1923). McKenna's exception to his "efficiency" philosophy seemed confined to
cases involving cartelization. See United States v. Pacific & Artic Ry. & Navi-
gation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226
U.S. 20 (1912).
73. See United Shoe , 247 U.S. at 58 (citations omitted); cf. L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 1, § 152, at 434-35 ("Motion Picture Patents was in a technical sense
a narrow holding. It went no further than to rule that use in violation of the
noticed condition was not infringement; it left open the question whether the
restriction could be achieved by exacting a covenant from the user.
74. See United Shoe , 247 U.S. at 58.
75. Id. at 56.
76. Id at 57.
77. Id. at 65-66.
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which the other concurred, with Justice Pitney concurring in
both. Justice Day's dissent reveals that he, like Justice Clarke,
was a strong advocate of vigorous application of the antitrust
laws.7s His dissent rejected the plurality's attempt to distin-
guish Motion Picture Patents79 and cited the conclusions of the
House Judiciary Committee Report on the Clayton Act regard-
ing the lease clauses' detrimental effect on competitionsw Four
years later, Justice Day would write the majority opinion in the
Supreme Court's first tying case brought under section 3 of the
Clayton Act-the government suit against United Shoe filed in
1915 and decided in 1922.81
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. (United
Shoe 11),82 the Supreme Court found that United Shoe's tying
arrangements were unlawful under section 3. Justice Day,
writing for the majority, criticized counsel for creating a record
of thirty-one volumes, "[m]uch" of which had "but little bear-
ing on the real issues," 3 and foreshadowed future Supreme
Court attempts to avoid having district courts engage in lengthy
trials to determine whether the challenged tying arrangement
substantially lessened competition. 4 The Court dismissed the
78. See Watts, William R? Day, in 3 JUSTICES, supra note 64, at 1773, 1787
(observing that Justice Day's "legal philosophy and perhaps his personal incli-
nations led him to favor a vigorous use of the federal police power against the
great financial and industrial combinations").
79. See United Shoe , 247 U.S. at 71-72 (Day, C.J., joined by Pitney and
Clarke, JJ., dissenting).
80. See id. at 70 n.1 (Day, C.J., joined by Pitney and Clarke, JJ., dissent-
ing). Today it is difficult to understand why the majority in United Shoe I did
not conclude that Congress would not have adopted a new antitrust law specif-
ically dealing with tying arrangements had it not considered tying clauses ex-
empt from condemnation under the Sherman Act. Circuit Judge Putnam, a
member of the three-judge panel that heard United Shoe I in the district
court, said. "[W]e... have come to no conclusions... in regard to the effect
on the pending case of the legislation of Congress enacted since this case was
submitted to us ... ." United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 222 F. 349,
361 (D. Mass. 1915); cf. International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States,
298 U.S. 131, 137 (1936) ("When Congress had before it the bill which became
§ 3 of the Clayton Act, it was familiar with the decision of this Court in Henry
v. A.B. Dick Co .... and with the contentions made in United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Co... . , then pending before this Court--cases in which it
was held that a tying clause could lawfully be extended to unpatented supplies
for a leased patented machine.... One purpose of § 3 undoubtedly was to
prevent such use of the tying clause. . . .") (citations omitted).
81. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922); see FED-
ERAL ANTrrRusT LAws, supra note 43, at 109 (case 169).
82. 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
83. See id. at 454.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 120-88.
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"efficiency" arguments advanced by United Shoe as irrelevant,
stating: "No matter how good the machines of the United Com-
pany may be, or how efficient its service, it is not at liberty to
lease its machines upon conditions prohibited by a valid law of
the United States. '85 Therefore, many of the factors that led
the Court in United Shoe I to find that the clauses were lawful
under the Sherman Act had no place in an analysis of their le-
gality under the Clayton Act.86 The Court concluded that it
was "apparent" that United Shoe's tying agreements violated
section 3 by necessarily lessening competition and tending to
create a monopoly.8 7 In support of this conclusion, the Court
noted:
When it is considered that the United Company occupies a dominat-
ing position in supplying shoe machinery of the classes involved,
these covenants signed by the lessee and binding upon him effectually
prevent him from acquiring the machinery of a competitor of the les-
sor except at the risk of forfeiting the right to use the machines fur-
nished by the United Company which may be absolutely essential to
the prosecution and success of his business.
88
Justice McKenna dissented from United Shoe II without
opinion.
The Supreme Court's next tying decision came a year later
in FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co.,89 a suit brought by the FTC as
part of a series of proceedings against many gasoline refiners 0
Sinclair leased unpatented gasoline storage tanks and pumps to
service stations on the condition that the stations would use the
products only with Sinclair's gasoline. 91 The Court distin-
guished this tying arrangement from that in United Shoe II,
85. United Shoe II, 258 U.S. at 462.
86. See id. at 459-62. The Court was explicit in its determination that it
was not bound by United Shoe I in this Clayton Act challenge, stating that
"[t]he Sherman Act and the Clayton Act provide different tests of liability."
See id. at 459. Justice Day also explained:
That the leases were attacked .. . as violative of the Sherman
Act is true, but they were sustained as valid and binding agreements
within the rights of holders of patents. The Clayton Act specifically
applies to goods, wares, machinery, etc., whether "patented or unpat-
ented." This provision was inserted in the Clayton Act with the ex-
press purpose of preventing rights granted by letters patent from
securing immunity from the inhibitions of the act.
Id. at 460 (emphasis in original).
87. See id. at 457.
88. Id. at 457-58 (emphasis added).
89. 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
90. The FTC had ordered at least 30 refiners and wholesalers to stop us-
ing leases of the sort adopted by Sinclair. Four courts of appeal had found the




emphasizing that Sinclair's provisions did not prevent the
lessee service stations from purchasing gasoline from any other
refiner.9 2 Under a strict reading of the contract,
[t]here is no covenant... which obligates the lessee not to sell
the goods of another, and its language cannot be so onstrued....
Many competitors seek to sell excellent brands of gasoline and no one
of them is essential to the retail business. The lessee is free to buy
wherever he chooses; he may freely accept and use as many pumps as
he wishes and may discontinue any or all of them. He may carry on
business as his judgment dictates and his means permit, save only that
he cannot use the lessor's equipment for dispensing another's brand.
By investing a comparatively small sum, he can buy an outfit and use
it without hindrance. He can have [Sinclair's] gasoline, with the pump
or without the pump, and many competitors seek to supply his
needs.9
3
The Court also held that the tying clauses were not an "unfair
practice" under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
finding that the arrangement was a "practical method" for Sin-
clair to prevent "passing off" 94 and to ensure that its gasoline
was being properly handled.9 5 Finally, the Court, apparently
convinced that Sinclair's practices would foster the develop-
ment of roadside service stations, found no monopolistic or an-
ticompetitive purpose underlying the leases.96 The Court
92. As the Court explained:
[Sinclair's] written contract does not undertake to limit the
lessee's right to use or deal in the goods of a competitor of the lessor.
but leaves him free to follow his own judgment... But counsel for
the Commission insist that inasmuch as lessees generally ... will not
encumber themselves with more than one equipment, the practical ef-
fect of the restrictive covenant is to confine most dealers to the prod-
ucts of their lessors; and we are asked to hold that, read in the light of
these facts, the contract falls within the condemnation of the (Clayton
Act].
Id at 473.
93. Id at 474. The Court ignored the FTC's findings that only a few of
Sinclair's lessees needed more than one pump or handled Sinclair's competi-
tors. See i. at 466. Such a finding, of course, rendered the lessee's theoretical
freedom to install other pumps irrelevant.
94. See id at 475 ("Some dealers regard it as the best practical method of
preserving the integrity of their brands and securing wide distribution...
[The dealer] is also vitally interested in putting his brand within easy reach of
consumers with ample assurance of its genuineness."). Passing off would oc-
cur if gasoline dealers could sell gasoline refined by someone other than Sin-
clair from a pump prominently marked as one of Sinclair's. Passing off is
itself an unfair method of competition. See L. SULLiVAN, supra note 1, § 156,
at 453 n.17.
95. See Sinclair Refining, 261 U.S. at 475 ('The [gasoline] is highly in-
flammable and the method of handling it is important to the refiner.").
96. See id ("No purpose or power to acquire unlawful monopoly has been
disclosed, and the record does not show that the probable effect of the practice
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concluded its opinion by rebuking the FTC for bringing the ac-
tion, emphasizing policies similar to those now emphasized by
the Chicago School:
The great purpose of the [Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act] was to advance the public interest by securing fair oppor-
tunity for the play of the contending forces ordinarily engendered by
an honest desire for gain. And to this end it is essential that those
who adventure their time, skill and capital should have large freedom
of action in the conduct of their own affairs." 97
The "open and wide ranging inquiry into potential harms
and benefits"98 employed in Sinclair stands in vivid contrast to
the indications in United Shoe II that only a limited inquiry
into the defendant's market position was necessary. The Sin-
clair decision came down during twelve straight years of Re-
publican rule, years in which .President Coolidge's catchy
assertion that "the business of America is business" 99 summed
up the prevalent attitude of the American public. Indeed, from
United Shoe I in 1918,100 followed by the government's disas-
trous defeat in the United States Steel case in 1920,101 until
Thurman Arnold's rejuvenation of antitrust in 1938,102 the
Court and, arguably, public opinion were hostile to tough, inno-
vative applications of the antitrust laws. 03
The decline of the antitrust laws is evident in Pick Manu-
facturing Co. v. General Motors Corp.,1°4 the next Supreme
will be unduly to lessen competition. Upon the contrary, it appears to have
promoted the public convenience by inducing many small dealers to enter the
business and put gasoline on sale at the crossroads.").
97. Id at 476.
98. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, § 152, at 435.
99. See B. EvANs, DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONs 83:5 (1968).
100. 247 U.S. 32 (1918); see supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
101. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
102. Thurman Arnold deservedly gained the name the "trustbuster" for his
vigorous, and largely successful, campaign for tough antitrust enforcement.
See Kramer, The Antitrust Division and the Supreme Court: 1890-1953, 40 VA.
L. REV. 433, 438, 441-45 (1954). For cases reflecting this success, see Para-
mount Pictures, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944);
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
103. See Kramer, supra note 102, at 439-41 (observing that the period from
1916 to 1933 was "the least successful ... for the Government in the Supreme
Court"). The period commencing in the mid-1970's was even more hostile to
antitrust enforcement than was this earlier period.
104. 299 U.S. 3 (1936) (per curiam), qffg 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935).
Although Pick was decided while Franklin D. Roosevelt was President, it
arose before he instituted vigorous antitrust enforcement as the prevailing
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Court case on tying arrangements, decided in 1936. Pick, the
first private action attacking a tying arrangement under section
3 to reach the Court, involved provisions in GM's dealer agree-
ments that required the dealers to use only parts approved by
GM in GM automobiles. 0 5 The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, relying on United Shoe II and Sinclair, concluded that
the restrictions were reasonable because the dealers were still
free to repair any other make of car and, when doing so, were
not obligated to use GM parts.1°6 In addition, the court of ap-
peals stressed that GM had a strong interest in ensuring that
defective or otherwise improper parts were not used in repair-
ing GM cars.1°7 Finally, the court found that the provisions had
not actually reduced competition. 08 The court, however, did
market regulator. Indeed, at that time President Roosevelt had not abandoned
the National Recovery Act and its concept of business cartelization.
105. See Pick, 299 U.S. at 3-4.
106. See Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641, 643-44 (7th
Cir. 1935) ('These dealers may repair any make of automobile, and in doing so
they may employ parts manufactured by [GM] or any other independent man-
ufacturer, provided the car being repaired is not [GM's] product. The restric-
tion is applicable only to [GM] cars.").
107. The court explained.
In the present case, [GM is] not licensing or selling to competing
manufacturers. [It is] selling automobiles to [its] designated dealers,
making to the purchasers from such dealers certain warranties, and
endeavoring to preserve the good will of the buying public.
... In the minds of the owners, the cars are identified and asso-
ciated with the manufacturer. If defective or inefficient repairs or
replacements should be made, and the cars, as a result, should operate
unsatisfactorily, the owners' recollections will naturally and inevita-
bly revert to the specific name and manufacturer thereof. Defective
parts, preventing efficient operation of cars, bring dissatisfaction with
the automobiles themselves. The natural result is blame of the manu-
facturer and consequent loss of sales.
The automobile is a complicated mechanism, the refined product
of scientific engineering after long investigation, close competition,
experiment, and practical experience. Replacement and repair parts
must be of accurate measurement, appropriate, satisfactory material,
and proper mechanical construction. Otherwise, disaster may result.
[GM] insist[s] with [its] dealers, therefore, that the latter shall not re-
pair [GM's] product with used or second-hand parts or with parts
other than those manufacturerd by [GM], or for [it] under [its] specifi-
cations, for the express purpose of replacing parts in or repairing [its]
product... Clearly this protects [GM] against the otherwise possi-
ble use of defective parts in repairing or making replacements in [its]
products. The preservation of the good will of the public is directly
involved.
IL at 643.
108. See i& at 644 ("[IThe record shows that competition in the sale of re-
placement parts for automobiles instead of growing less has substantially in-
creased through the period during which the provisions complained of have
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not discuss whether GM held a dominant market position. In-
stead, the Supreme Court affirmed in a brief per curiam opin-
ion, stating only that no clear error was shown in the
findings.1 09
In that same year, however, the Court dismissed a defense
in International Business Machines Corp. v. United States"0
that was similar to one that the the Seventh Circuit had found
persuasive in Pick. IBM required lessees of its patented tabu-
lating machines to use only cards manufactured by IBM with
the machines."' Challenged under section 3 of the Clayton
Act, IBM defended on the ground that the purpose and effect
of the tying arrangements was to protect its goodwill by
preventing the use of unsuitable cards with IBM machines." 2
In a unanimous opinion, the Court rejected this argument, stat-
ing that IBM could have achieved the same protective end by
simply conditioning its leases on the use of conforming cards
without specifying that the cards be manufactured by IBM." 3
In determining whether IBM's tying agreements had an ad-
verse effect on competition, the Court stressed that IBM con-
trolled eighty-one per cent of the market for the tabulating
been in force and, while it may be that competition would have increased more
rapidly in the absence of such provisions, the trial court rightfully concluded
that such was not the 'substantial lessening of competition' which the Clayton
Act was designed to prevent."). Arguably, the tying clauses in Sinclair, 261
U.S. 463 (1923), would be treated differently today than those in Pick. General
Motors had a relatively large market share whereas Sinclair did not. In 1934,
the last full calendar year before Pick was decided, GM cars accounted for ap-
proximately 40% of all new cars registered that year. See AUTOMOTIVE NEWS,
Apr. 25, 1955, at 73 (tabulating registrations of new cars by make, 1922-1950).
On the other hand, Sinclair had "[m]any competitors seek[ing] to sell ... gas-
oline," and the lessees of the pumps could "have [Sinclair's] gasoline, with the
pump or without the pump," as long as they did not "use the lessor's equip-
ment for dispensing another's brand." See FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261
U.S. 463, 474 (1923); supra text accompanying note 93.
109. See Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 299 U.S. 3, 4 (1936).
110. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
111. See id at 134.
112. See id.
113. See id at 138-40. Similarly, in Pick, 299 U.S. 3 (1936), GM could have
protected its goodwill by requiring its dealers to use only those parts that met
GM's standards of quality and performance. Cf. United States v. Mercedes-
Benz of N. Am., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (alleging that Merce-
des-Benz' requirement that its franchised dealers obtain replacement parts for
Mercedes automobiles from a manufacturer-approved source constituted an il-
legal tying agreement). In 1982, the Justice Department dropped its suit
against Mercedes-Benz. See Justice Dismisses Tying Case Against Mercedes-
Benz for Lack of Economic Benefit; Court May Review Action, 42 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1056, at 587 (Mar. 18, 1982).
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cards, it earned a "substantial" profit from the cards' sales, and
its annual gross receipts for the machines and cards averaged
almost thirteen million dollars.- 4 The Court consequently con-
demned the agreements under section 3, holding that "[t]hese
facts... can leave no doubt that the effect of the condition in
[IBM's] leases 'may be to substantially lessen competition,' and
that it tends to create monopoly.""u5
Thus, within twenty years, the Court handed down four
opinions on tying agreements under section 3: United Shoe II
and IBM condemning the tying agreements and Sinclair and
Pick upholding them. The results, if not the reasoning, can be
reconciled through the cases' factual differences. One signifi-
cant factor distinguishing United Shoe II and IBM from Sin-
clair and Pick is the market share held by the respective
defendants. Both United Shoe and IBM held an overwhelming
share of the market in the tied and the tying products.n 6
Neither Sinclair nor GM held comparable market shares in
their products.- 7 Moreover, the tying products in both IBM
and United Shoe II were patented; those in Sinclair and Pick
apparently were not." 8 At the time of the IBM decision, there-
114. See IBM, 298 U.S. at 136.
115. See id- The Court relied heavily on the congressional purpose under-
lying § 3 of the Clayton Act, noting that the section had been passed to prede-
termine the outcome in United Shoe II. See id. at 137-38.
116. United Shoe Machinery controlled 95% of the market for shoe ma-
chinery, the tied and tying products. See United Shoe I, 258 U.S. 451, 455
(1922). IBM controlled well over 80% of the market for mechanical tabulating
machines using perforated cards. See Brief for the United States at 7 n.3, In-
ternational Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); see also
International Business Machs. Corp..v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 133 (1936)
(noting that IBM and one competitor were the only sellers of mechanical tabu-
lating machines). IBM also controlled 81% of the market for tabulating cards,
the tied product. See IBM, 298 U.S. at 136.
117. See supra note 108.
118. Sinclair's tying product, gasoline pumps, was unpatented but was
trademarked. Both GM's automobiles and its replacement parts were also
trademarked. Indeed, GM had sued Standard Products Manufacturing Co.,
whose major stockholder was the president and manager of Pick Manufactur-
ing Corp., for unfair competition and trademark infringement in 1928, charg-
ing Standard Products with "wilfully, fraudulently and deceptively marketing
and selling spurious hub caps, bearing plaintiff's trade marks." See Record at
20, Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 299 U.S. 3 (1936) (reproduction of
GM's answer). A permanent injunction was issued in 1930. Id. at 2L In 1930,
GM instituted another action on the same grounds, this time against Pick
Manufacturing, its president Carl Pick, and Standard Products Manufacturing
Co. Id. GM obtained a preliminary injunction. Id. at 22. While an appeal was




fore, the Court had yet to find a tying arrangement unlawful
under section 3 of the Clayton Act in which the defendant did
not have either an overwhelming share of the market or a pat-
ent on the tying product. Furthermore, the Court had clearly
held that such clauses were not illegal under the Sherman
Act.119
Then came the 1947 opinion in International Salt Co. v.
United States.120 The Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment, whose staff was still dominated by attorneys recruited by
the great trustbuster, Thurman Arnold, brought suit against In-
ternational Salt under both section 1 of the Sherman Act and
section 3 of the Clayton Act.121 International Salt admitted
that it leased patented salt-dispensing machines on the condi-
tion that the machines would be used to dispense only its salt
products 2 2 and that its 1944 sales of machine-dispensed salt
were approximately $500,000.m Based on these facts, the gov-
ernment moved for summary judgment. No other evidence was
in the record regarding International Salt's market share in
either the tying or the tied products, 12 4 nor was there any evi-
dence bearing on International Salt's justifications for the re-
straint.125 The district court granted the government's motion
on both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act claims, and the
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, stating:
We think the admitted facts left no genuine issue [as to whether the
119. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77.
120. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
121. See id at 393.
122. See id The contract for one type of machine provided that salt could
be purchased from other sources if it was available at a lower price than that
of International Salt. Id at 396.
123. Id at 395.
124. The Court did suggest that salt-dispensing machines were available
from other sources. See id at 399; cf. D. ARMENTANO, supra note 4, at 205
("Thus, the extent and degree of competition in the tying good [in Interna-
tional Salt] remained an unexamined--and as far as the Supreme Court was
concerned, irrelevant-issue."). The Court did not examine International
Salt's market share of salt, the tied product. See D. ARMENTANO, supra note 4,
at 205 ("The Court never asked, nor was it revealed, whether competition in
the market for salt was significantly affected by the tying arrangement be-
tween International and its machine customers."); cf. R. BORK, supra note 3, at
367 ("It is inconceivable that anybody could hope to get a monopoly, or any-
thing remotely resembling a monopoly, in a product like salt by foreclosing
the utterly insignificant fraction of the market represented by the salt passing
through these leased machines. Whatever International Salt thought It was
accomplishing with these tying requirements, it was not monopoly.").
125. See International Salt, 332 U.S. at 396; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1,
§ 152, at 436.
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restraint was unreasonable or substantially lessened competi-
tion] .... [lit is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from
any substantial market. ... The volume of business affected by
these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial and
the tendency of the arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly
seems obvious.1 26
International Salt thus prevented defendants who tied pat-
ented products to unpatented products from introducing evi-
dence showing that the tying arrangements had not
substantially lessened competition.
International Salt's contracts were far less onerous to the
lessee and far less pervasive in the industry than were the tying
contracts of United Shoe Machinery, which the Court had held
not to violate the Sherman Act thirty years earlier32 7 Thus, in
subjecting International Salt's tying arrangements to Sherman
Act restrictions, International Salt silently overruled United
Shoe . This overruling has had a significant impact on the law
of tying arrangements. Although section 3 of the Clayton Act
is confined to the tying of "commodities,"'-2 the Sherman Act
applies to any subject of commerce, whether tangible or intan-
gible, commodity or service.'m Indeed, all of the tying arrange-
ments reviewed in opinions of the Court since International
Salt have involved Sherman Act challenges and, with one possi-
ble exception,130 a tying or tied product that was an intangible
such as credit or a service such as advertising, transportation, or
hospital care.' 31
The next case in which the Supreme Court had an opportu-
nity to discuss tying clauses came two years later in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations).la2 It did not in-
126. International Sal; 332 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted).
127. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918); supra
notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
128. See supra text accompanying note 35.
129. See supra text accompanying note 13.
130. The reels of film that were tied in United States v. Loew's Inc., 371
U.S. 38 (1962), arguably were "goods" within the meaning of § 3 of the Clayton
Act.
131. See Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct 1551
(1984) (anesthesiological services tied to use of hospital services); United States
Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (prefabricated houses
tied to credit for the acquisition and development of land); United States v.
Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (copyrighted feature motion picture films for
television booked in blocks); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958) (land tied to railroad transportation); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (newspaper advertising in afternoon tied to
morning newspaper advertising).
132. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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volve tying but rather involved full requirements contracts be-
tween Standard Oil and its independent service-station
dealers.133 The suit was brought by the government under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act,
134
with the only issue in controversy being the contracts' effect on
competition. 35 The district court held that the government
met its burden under both the Sherman and the Clayton Acts
simply by demonstrating that the contracts covered "a substan-
tial number of outlets and a substantial amount of products,
whether considered comparatively or not."'1 36
The Supreme Court affirmed this "quantitative substantial-
ity"'137 test under the Clayton Act but declined to address the
Sherman Act issue.138 In a stimulating and challenging opinion
by Justice Frankfurter, the Court noted that Standard Sta-
tions's basic facts were indistinguishable from those in Interna-
tional Salt "unless a distinction is to be drawn . . . between
requirements contracts and contracts tying the sale of a nonpat-
ented to a patented product.' ' 3 9 In discussing arguments sup-
porting a less condemnatory rule for requirements contracts,
Justice Frankfurter crafted one of the most important state-
ments on tying agreements in the modern antitrust jargon:
"Tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the sup-
pression of competition.' 140 In contrast, he continued, require-
133. See id. at 295-96.
134. Id. at 294.
135. See id. at 297-98.
136. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 850, 875 (S.D. Cal.
1948), affd, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
137. Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 298.
138. The Court stated that "§ 3 of the Clayton Act was directed to prohibit-
ing specific practices even though not covered by the broad terms of the Sher-
man Act," see id. at 297 (footnote omitted) and, therefore, it was "appropriate
to consider first whether the enjoined contracts fall within the prohibition of
the narrower Act," id. Upon holding that the requirements contracts violated
§ 3, the Court found it unnecessary to consider their validity under the Sher-
man Act. See id. at 314.
139. See id. at 305. The Court reasoned that "the showing that Standard's
requirements contracts affected a gross business of $58,000,000 comprising 6.7%
of the total in the area goes far toward supporting the inference that competi-
tion has been or probably will be substantially lessened." See id, (footnote
omitted).
140. Id. at 305-06. Justice Frankfurter forcefully rejected the argument
that had been successful in Pick:
The justification most often advanced in their defense-the protection
of the good will of the manufacturer of the tying device-fails in the
usual situation because specification of the type and quality of the
product to be used in connection with the tying device is protection
enough. If the manufacturer's brand of the tied product is in fact su-
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ments contracts "may well be of economic advantage to
buyers[,] ... sellers, and ... the consuming public."' 4'
Although the balance of the argument apparently favored re-
quirements contracts,i 42 the Court promulgated a test for chal-
lenging requirements contracts under the Clayton Act that was
as easy for a plaintiff to meet as was the International Salt test
for challenging a tie: the plaintiff need only show that the re-
quirements contract applied to "a substantial share of the line
of commerce affected."' 43
perior to that of competitors, the buyer will presumably choose it any-
way. The only situation, indeed, in which the protection of good will
may necessitate the use of tying clauses is where specifications for a
substitute would be so detailed that they could not practically be sup-
plied. In the usual case only the prospect of reducing competition
would persuade the seller to adopt such a contract and only his con-
trol of the supply of the tying device . . . could induce a buyer to
enter one.
Id. at 306 (citations omitted).
141. See id. at 306.
142. The Court invalidated the requirements contracts because "serious
difficulties" would result from any attempt to measure the contracts' actual ef-
fect on competititon, see id. at 308, and because the legislative history of § 3 of
the Clayton Act revealed Congress's intent not to require "the same tests of
detriment to the public interest" as did the Sherman Act, see id, at 312-13.
This last point, however, was not only partially based on a mistaken summary
of § 3's legislative history, see Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 39, at 933-37, it
also ignores the vital fact that International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392 (1947), had "rejected the necessity of demonstrating economic conse-
quences" of the tying arrangements, see Standard Stations 337 U.S. at 304, in
challenges under § 3 of the Clayton Act and under § 1 of the Sherman Act, see
supra text accompanying notes 120-3L
143. See Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 314. Justice Douglas wrote a sepa-
rate opinion, without describing it as a dissent or a concurrence, in which he
accused the majority of consciously encouraging monopolies in the oil industry
by invalidating requirements contracts beneficial to the independent gasoline
dealers. See id. at 320-21 (Douglas, J., separate opinion).
Justice Jackson, the author of the International Salt opinion less than two
years before, dissented in an opinion in which Chief Justice Vinson and Jus-
tice Burton joined. He stated. "I cannot agree that the requirements contract
is per se an illegal one under the antitrust law .... I am not convinced that
the requirements contract as here used is a device for suppressing competition
instead of a device for waging competition." Id. at 323 (Jackson, J., joined by
Vinson, C.J., and Burton, J., dissenting). Clearly, at least the three dissenters
thought that there was a distinction between requirements contracts and tying
arrangements that required the effects of the former to be explored judicially
before being condemned under the Clayton or Sherman Acts.
It is likely that Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court in International
Salt and his dissent in Standard Stations will stand the test of time better than
will Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Standard Stations; yet the
fact remains that the Court has not as yet, after 36 years, explicitly modified
its strict Standard Stations rule condemning most requirements contracts. But
cf. Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1568 n.51
19851 1039
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Standard Stations's dictum that tying agreements "serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition"
produced two very different results. First, it supplied the Court
in future tying cases with a definitive statement supporting a
per se rule.1 " Second, it indirectly prompted law journal arti-
cles dealing with the economics of tying arrangements. 145
These articles criticized Standard Stations's dictum, outlining
various purposes for tying arrangements that were economi-
cally defensible and sometimes beneficial.146 Despite some indi-
cations that lower courts heeded the articles' demand for a
more searching economic analysis in antitrust decisions,147 a
majority of the Supreme Court seemingly ignored the criticism
for two decades, at least in the context of tying arrangements.
The articles, however, were instrumental in adding fuel to the
ongoing debate between the proponents of an efficiency-based
model of antitrust laws and those who saw the laws as an in-
(1984) ("Like any exclusive requirements contract, this contract could be un-
lawful if it foreclosed so much of the market from penetration by Roux's com-
petitors as to unreasonably restrain competition in the affected market, the
market for anesthesiological services. . . . However, respondent has not at-
tempted to make this showing.") (citations omitted); id. at 1576 (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring) ("Exclusive
dealing is an unreasonable restraint on trade only when a significant fraction
of buyers or sellers are frozen out of a market by the exclusive deal.") (citat-
ing Standard Stations); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) (holding that franchise agreements between manufacturers and retail-
ers barring the retailers from selling the franchised product from locations
other than those specified in the agreement should be judged by the rule of
reason).
144. See infra text accompanying notes 149-88.
145. See, e.g., Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New"
Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 313-37 (1954) (analyzing exclu-
sive dealing and full requirements contracts, including tie-ins); Lockhart &
Sacks, supra note 39, at 942-48; Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1958); Note, Section 3 of the
Clayton Act-Coexisting Standards of Legality? 49 COLUM. L. REv. 241 (1949);
see also J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR COMPETION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF ANTrrRusT POLICY 23-24, 189-97 (1954).
146. See Bowman, supra note 145, at 20 ("Analysis of the situations in
which sellers find tie-ins useful casts doubt upon the validity of the statement
that the only purpose of tie-ins is monopolistic exploitation."); Turner, supra
note 145, at 65-73 (suggesting that some tying arrangements promote competi-
tion and should not be judged under a per se rule).
147. District Judge Charles Wyzanski, for example, appointed an econo-
mist, Professor Carl Kaysen, as his law clerk following the Court's opinion in
Standard Stations. Kaysen served as clerk during the trial in the early 1950's
of United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States (United Shoe III), 110 F. Supp.
295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam).
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strument for promoting a multiplicity of competitors, and thus
political democracy.14
The next tying case to reach the Supreme Court, Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 49 decided in 1953, in-
volved a requirement by New Orleans's leading newspaper pub-
lisher that any national and classified advertisers who
advertised in its morning Times-Picayune had to place the
same ad in its afternoon States.'sO Although there were no
other morning newspapers of general circulation in New Orle-
ans, the afternoon States was locked in a competitive struggle
with the New Orleans Item.'5 ' The government challenged this
so-called "forced combination" 5 2 advertising under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. s In a five-to-four decision, however, the
Supreme Court upheld the practice and fashioned a new rule to
govern tying arrangements under section 1 of the Sherman Act
and section 3 of the Clayton Act.
Attempting to reconcile its previous opinions on tying ar-
rangements, the Court stated that a tying arrangement violates
section 3 of the Clayton Act "[w]hen the seller enjoys a monop-
olistic position in the market for the 'tying' product, or if a sub-
stantial volume of commerce in the 'tied' product is restrained,
*.. because from either factor the requisite potential lessening
of competition is inferred."'i 4 This rule relies heavily on the
reasoning of the Standard Stations opinion.'s5 If requirements
contracts, whether serving good or bad purposes,'5 are illegal
under section 3 if they merely "foreclose" competition "in a
substantial share of the line of commerce affected,"157 then ty-
ing arrangements, "serv[ing] hardly any purpose beyond the
148. For a recent article from the Chicago School arguing that there should
be no presumption against tying arrangements under the antitrust laws, see
Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 143-46; see also id. at 146 n.24 (listing other
sources).
149. 345 U.S. 594 (1953). The author was senior trial counsel for the United
States and was on the brief for the United States in the Supreme Court in the
Times-Picayune case.
150. See iti at 598-600.
151. See id, at 616-20.
152. Id. at 597.
153. See id. at 596-97.
154. See id. at 608-09 (emphasis in original).
155. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
156. See Standard Stations, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); supra notes 141-42
and accompanying text.




suppression of competition"'5 8 should command at least as
strict a test. Tying arrangements, therefore, are illegal under
the Clayton Act if they foreclose competition in a substantial
share of the market.
The Court, however, adopted a different rule for judging
tying arrangements under the Sherman Act. Distinguishing
the "narrower standards" of section 3 of the Clayton Act,159 the
Court required that tying arrangements must meet both strands
of its Clayton Act test in order to violate section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. 160 Thus, the plaintiff must establish that the defend-
ant "enjoys a monopolistic position" in the tying product's
market and that the arrangement restrains a "substantial vol-
ume of commerce" in the tied product. The Court held that
the government's Sherman Act challenge in Times-Picayune
failed this test: even if the publisher's advertising practice
could accurately be termed a tying arrangement, it did not vio-
late the Sherman Act because Times-Picayune did not occupy a
"dominant position" in the newspaper-advertising market of
New Orleans.16 1
Times-Picayune solidified the trend in the Supreme
Court's tying cases toward establishing firm "rules" to predict
the probable effects of tying contracts without engaging in a de-
tailed investigation of their actual impact. Thus, the Court did
not address whether the tying agreements restrained trade or
lessened competition in fact, but rather examined whether such
a result was so likely as not to require that plaintiff be put to
its proofs on the question.162 The Court's focus eased both the
plaintiff's burden of producing complicated proofs tracking the
arrangement's effects and the trial court's burden of engaging
in lengthy trials judging the proofs.
The next tying case to reach the Court, Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States,163 decided in 1958, went even fur-
ther in reducing the proofs necessary to establish that the tying
arrangements were unlawful. Northern Pacific required pur-
chasers and lessees of its land to ship on Northern Pacific lines
158. See Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 305-06; supra text accompanying
note 140.
159. See Times-Picayne, 345 U.S. at 608-09.
160. See id. at 609
161. See id. at 610-13.
162. For example, the Court referred to "the requisite potential lessening
of competition." See id. at 609 (emphasis added).
163. 356 U.S. 1 (1958), affg 142 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Wash. 1956). The author
was on the brief for the United States in the district court.
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all commodities produced or manufactured on that land unless
its competitors offered better rates.16 4 The government
brought suit against Northern Pacific under only the Sherman
Act,165 presumably because transportation was a service, not a
commodity. In the district court, the government successfully
adopted the same trial tactic that had proved so effective in In-
ternational Salt: a motion for summary judgment preventing
the railroad from introducing evidence to justify its arrange-
ments on any grounds, including their reasonableness or lack of
a substantial effect on competition.266
In the Supreme Court, Northern Pacific argued that the
government had failed to show that it held a "monopolistic po-
sition" in the tying product-lan&'1  Attempting to bring the
arrangements within the International Salt holding, the gov-
ernment argued that each parcel of land was as unique as a pat-
ented product and, therefore, each parcel had "sufficiently
peculiar characteristics so that [it] can serve as a basis for
wielding monopolistic control."'16 Consequently, Northern Pa-
cific's extensive land holdings gave it the "monopolistic lever-
age" by which a purchaser or lessee desiring a particular tract
of land "could be coerced into also agreeing to ship the produce
of that land over the Northern Pacific's lines."'169
Justice Black's majority opinion, however, did not rely on
this patent analogy, but instead delicately rewrote the Times-
Picayune rule by finding its requirement satisfied when the de-
fendant has "sufficient economic power to impose an apprecia-
ble restraint on free competition in the tied product (assuming
all the time, of course, that a 'not insubstantial' amount of in-
164. Id. at 3.
165. See id. at 3-4.
166. See id. at 7-10; supra text accompanying note 126.
167. On appeal, Northern Pacific argued that its "dominant position" must
be measured by a showing that it owned a monopoly of "available lands of a
particular type" in the area. Because this control was a question of fact not
decided by the lower court, Northern Pacific asked that the summary judg-
ment for the government be reversed. See Brief for Appellants at 31-33,
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
168. See Brief for the United States at 17, Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
169. Id. at 9. The district court had relied on this argument when granting
the government's motion for summary judgment, stating- "Unrestricted fee-
simple title to land vests in the owner absolute domination of the market in
such land. By the ownership of the lands and resulting dominance in the mar-
ket therefor defendants were able to impose the [tying] clauses in question on
the grantees and lessees of the land." United States v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
142 F. Supp. 679, 684-85 (W.D. Wash. 1956), affd, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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terstate commerce is affected).' 1 70 Noting that there was no
"real doubt that a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate com-
merce was. . . affected,' 71 Justice Black found sufficient "eco-
nomic power" in Northern Pacific's
extensive landholdings which it used as leverage to induce large num-
bers of purchasers and lessees to give it preference, to the exclusion of
its competitors, in carrying goods or produce from the land trans-
ferred to them ...
• . . The very existence of this host of tying arrangements is It-
self compelling evidence of the defendant's great power, at least
where, as here, no other explanation has been offered for the exist-
ence of these restraints.
172
Thus, the Court found that Northern Pacific's tying arrange-
ments violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, even though the
arrangements did not involve a patented product and even
though the district court had made no findings that Northern
Pacific "had a 'dominant position' or . . . 'sufficient economic
power'. . . in the relevant land market.' 7 3
The Court continued to apply Northern Pacific's less strin-
gent standard of proof in subsequent tying cases. Thus, in 1962,
the Court held unanimously in United States v. Loew's Inc.,174
that block-booking of copyrighted feature motion pictures for
television violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.175 Justice
Goldberg, writing for the Court, stated:
170. See Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 11.
171. See id at 7.
172. Id. at 7-8.
173. See id. at 14 (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter and Whittaker, JJ., dis-
senting). Justice Harlan was keenly aware of the extension of the law of tying
arrangements that the Court was crafting through Justice Black's opinion, and
he was prophetic in stating that the Court's opinion, "taken in conjunction
with its approval of the summary disposition of this case, will leave courts and
lawyers in confusion as to what the proper standards now are for judging tying
clauses under the Sherman Act." See id. at 19 (Harlan, J., joined by Frank-
furter and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting).
174. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
On the basis of Northern Pac., 356 U.S. 1 (1958), and International Salt,
298 U.S. 131 (1936), the Court in 1961, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed a dis-
trict court's judgment for the government in a tying case brought under § 1 of
the Sherman Act. See Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. United States, 365 U.S. 567
(1961) (per curiam), affg 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960). Jerrold, which
manufactured community television antenna equipment, required purchasers
to enter into a service contract with Jerrold. See Jerrold 187 F. Supp. at 552.
The district court held that the arrangement was reasonable at its inception
because "Jerrold's short and long-term well-being depended on the success" of
the first systems sold. See id. at 557. As the industry's future became more
certain, however, the tying arrangement became unreasonable and, therefore,
unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act. See id. at 557-58.
175. See Loew's, 371 U.S. at 39.
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[Iying arrangements] are an object of antitrust concern for two rea-
sons-they may force buyers into giving up the purchase of substi-
tutes for the tied product,... and they may destroy the free access
of competing suppliers of the tied product to the consuming mar-
ket .... A tie-in contract may have one or both of these undesir-
able effects when the seller, by virtue of his position in the market for
the tying product, has economic leverage sufficient to induce his cus-
tomers to take the tied product along with the tying item. The stan-
dard of illegality is that the seller must have "sufficient economic
power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product".... Market domi-
nance-some power to control price and to exclude competition-is by
no means the only test of whether the seller has the requisite eco-
nomic power. Even absent a showing of market dominance, the cru-
cial economic power may be inferred from the tying product's
desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes.1 78
In a footnote, the Court extended the established per se con-
demnation of tying arrangements involving a patented tying
product to encompass copyrighted tying products: "[W]hen the
tying product is patented or copyrighted, ... sufficiency of
economic power is presumed."'177
After Loew's, one commentator noted that "[t]he next logi-
cal step appeared to be the de facto elimination of the market
power criterion by a holding that the very success of a tying ar-
rangement was proof of the seller's power."' 78 The Court ap-
proached, but did not reach, this point in Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner 1),' 79 an opinion that
marked the zenith of the Court's attempt to reduce the plain-
tiff's burden of proof on market power. Fortner, a real estate
developer, obtained credit from United States Steel Homes
Credit Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of United States
Steel, to purchase and develop land for erecting prefabricated
houses.18 0 The credit terms were exceptionally favorable; no
176. Id. at 44-45 (citations and footnote omitted). The Court reiterated its
desire to avoid extensive trials:
Since the requisite economic power may be found on the basis of
either uniqueness or consumer appeal, and since market dominance in
the present context does not necessitate a demonstration of market
power in the sense of § 2 of the Sherman Act, it should seldom be
necessary in a tie-in sale case to embark upon a full-scale factual in-
quiry into the scope of the relevant market for the tying product and
into the corollary problem of the seller's percentage share in that
market.
Id. at 45 n.4.
177. Id. at 45 n.4.
178. See Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 CoRNELL L. REv. 161, 163 (1970).
179. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
180. See id. at 496-97.
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other source would have extended credit on comparable
terms.181 As a condition of the loans, however, Fortner was re-
quired to purchase its prefabricated houses only from United
States Steel.182 Fortner brought suit in 1962 under the Sher-
man Act for treble damages and an injunction. After pretrial
proceedings, the district court entered a summary judgment in
favor of the defendants, finding that Fortner failed to raise any
question of fact in support of an antitrust violation.18 3
In 1969, the Court reversed the summary judgment in a
five-to-four decision.'8 Justice Black, writing for the majority,
found that defendants' sale arrangements unquestionably af-
fected a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce;
Fortner's annual purchases of the prefabricated houses
amounted to almost $200,000, and the value of the sales fore-
closed by the tying clauses was between two and four million
dollars annually. 8 5 Justice Black further stated that Fortner
would prevail if it could demonstrate that United States Steel
had "sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable re-
straint on free competition,' 186 either because defendants'
unique financing terms manifested "a substantial competitive
advantage" or because of "the possibility of market power over
borrowers in the credit market."' 87 The Court therefore re-
manded the case for a trial on the issue of United States Steel's
market power.' a8
After a month-long trial on remand, the district court di-
rected a verdict for Fortner on the issue of liability and submit-
ted the issue of damages to the jury. The court of appeals
reversed the directed verdict and remanded for a trial on the
issue of liability.8 9 The parties agreed to waive a jury, instead
submitting the issue to the court for determination on the rec-
ord. The district court held once again for Fortner, and the
181. Id. at 504-05.
182. 1& at 497.
183. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 293 F. Supp. 762,
766-69 (W.D. Ky. 1966), affd mem, 404 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S.
495 (1969).
184. Justice White dissented in an opinion in which Justice Harlan joined,
and Justice Fortas dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Stewart.
185. See id at 501-02.
186. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958); see supra
text accompanying note 170.
187. See Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 505-06.
188. See id at 510.
189. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 452 F.2d 1095,
1103 (6th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).
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court of appeals affirmed. 190 The Supreme Court granted
Unites States Steel's petition for certiorari' 9 1-- almost fifteen
years after Fortner had filed suit, after three successive judg-
ments had been entered by the district court and, no doubt, af-
ter both sides had spent millions of dollars in legal fees and
costs.
The Court's composition had changed drastically by the
time the case reappeared before it in 1976. Justice Black, au-
thor of the Northern Pacific192 and Fortner i1s opinions, and
leader of the activist block favoring extension of the antitrust
laws, 194 had died in 1971,195 little more than two years after
Fortner 1196 and six years before the case reappeared.19 In ad-
dition, two other members of the majority in Fortner I, Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, were no longer sitting on
the Court;198 neither were two dissenters, Justices Harlan and
Fortas.199 The Court's decision in Fortner II portended the
drastic effect that these changes in the Court would have on
the law of tying arrangements.
In United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc
(Fortner I1),200 the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
190. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 523 F.2d 961,
964, 967 (6th Cir. 1975).
191. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 424 U.S. 907
(1976).
192. 356 U.S. 1 (1958); see supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
193. 394 U.S. 495 (1969); see supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
194. Justice Black wrote opinions for the Court extending antitrust law in
contexts other than tying arrangements. See, eg., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316 (1966) (exclusive dealing); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270 (1966) (mergers); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207 (1959) (group boycotts); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) ("intraenterprise conspiracy"); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (group boycotts); Fashion Originators' Guild of
Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts). Indeed, the Burger
Court is still involved in silently overruling or overtly modifying Justice
Black's antitrust opinions. For example, the Kiefer.Stewart case was over-
ruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2745
(1984), and United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), ar-
guably overruled Von's Grocery sub silentio.
195. See 404 U.S. vii (1971).
196. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
197. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner H), 429
U.S. 610 (1977).
198. Chief Justice Warren left the Court in 1969, see 395 U.S. vii (1969), and
Justice Douglas resigned in 1975, see 423 U.S. vii (1975).
199. Justice Harlan retired in 1971, see 404 U.S. ix (1971), and Justice For-
tas resigned in 1969, see 395 U.S. iii (1969).
200. 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
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district court's judgment for Fortner in an opinion by Justice
Stevens, who had succeeded Justice Douglas.20 1 Justice Stevens
defined the question at issue as being "whether the seller has
some advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for
the tying product. 20 2 The district court had apparently found
that Fortner had met at least an equivalent of this test, con-
cluding that United States Steel's tying product, its credit
terms, was "unique. ' 20 3 The district court consequently held
that the defendant necessarily had "significant economic
power" because it could not otherwise have offered Fortner
such uniquely favorable terms.20 4
Justice Stevens conceded that the "unique character of the
tying product has provided critical support for the finding of il-
legality in prior cases. '20 5 He qualified this statement, how-
ever, by asserting that this unique character must be
supplemented by a showing that "the seller has the power...
to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome
terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive
market. '20 6 Because the record did not reveal that United
States Steel's competitors were "unable to offer comparable fi-
nancing, '20 7 the record proved "nothing more than a willing-
ness to provide cheap financing in order to sell expensive
homes."20 8
It is difficult to imagine a tie between credit and a com-
modity that could meet Fortner II's test of illegality. The in-
surmountable burden imposed by the Court, as well as its
unpersuasive attempt to distinguish cases such as Northern Pa-
cific,20 9 appears to be an effort by the Court to obscure its be-
201. See Orland, John Paul Stevens, in 5 JusTICES, supra note 64, at 149,
149.
202. See Fortner I, 429 U.S. at 620.
203. See id at 614-16.
204. See id at 616-17.
205. See id at 619.
206. See id at 620 (footnote omitted).
207. See id at 622 n.15.
208. See id at 622 (footnote omitted).
209. 356 U.S. 1 (1958); see supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text. Jus-
tice Stevens made valiant efforts to distinguish Fortner's case against United
States Steel from the government's case against Northern Pacific. Justice Ste-
vens first said that the tie-in in Fortner "can be explained as a form of price
competition" in prefabricated homes, whereas that explanation would not
work in Northern Pac. because the railroad had not lowered its transportation
costs for its land lessees. See Fortner I, 429 U.S. at 619 n.10. Justice Stevens
then quoted the language in Northern Pac. that "common sense" as well as
"testimony" made it "evident" that the railroad's "extensive landholdings"
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lief that it should have affirmed the summary judgment for the
defendants in Fortner I. The changed result was not caused by
any facts not appearing in the record during the prior appeal.2 '0
Rather, it can be traced to the Court's new members and their
perception that the plaintiff had no case unless all tying ar-
rangements involving a substantial amount of interstate com-
merce were unlawful per se and that this step was one that
should not be taken. This perception has been manifested in
the most recent Supreme Court case on tying arrangements, a
case that changes the face of the law.
III. THE PRESENT LAW OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS:
JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO. 2
V. HYDE
The latest Supreme Court decision on tying arrangements,
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,21' generates
numerous perplexing questions about its meaning and reach.
One of the few certainties garnered from the Court's opinion is
that the Court has retreated from the expansive interpretation
of the antitrust laws in Northern Pacific2 1 2 and Fortner 1213 to
the position taken in 1947 in International Salt.2 1 4 But if the
views of the four justices who filed a concurring opinion in
Hyde become the majority view, antitrust treatment of tying ar-
rangements will likely return to its 1918 status, when the Court
decided United Shoe L215
In Hyde, East Jefferson Hospital, located in the Jefferson
Parish district of New Orleans, was a party to a contract with a
firm of anesthesiologists, Roux & Associates, that specified that
Roux would provide all of the hospital's anesthesiological serv-
ices. 216 Dr. Edwin G. Hyde applied for admission to the hospi-
gave it "substantial economic power" because the land in question "was often
prized by those who purchased or leased it," see id. at 619 n.1 (quoting North-
ern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958)), and was "frequently
essential to their business activities," id. (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958)).
210. Cf Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 365 n.1
(1973) (reversing a judgment for Trans World more than seven years after it
had refused to do so in the same case on Hughes Tool's petition for a writ of
certiorari, which had been dismissed as improvidently granted).
211. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
212. 356 U.S. 1 (1958); see supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
213. 394 U.S. 495 (1969); see supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
214. 332 U.S. 392 (1947); see supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
215. 247 U.S. 32 (1918); see supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
216. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1554-55.
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tal staff as an anesthesiologist, but his application was denied
because of the Roux contract.2 1 7 Dr. Hyde sued, seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the contract was unlawful under the
Sherman Act and an injunction requiring that he be appointed
to the East Jefferson staff.2 18
The district court found that Dr. Hyde did not prove that
the hospital dominated the market in the tying product, "hospi-
tal services," because the contract affected only one of at least
twenty hospitals in the New Orleans area.219 Therefore, the
court held that the tying arrangement did not violate the Sher-
man Act.220 The court of appeals reversed, agreeing that the
contract between the hospital and Roux was a tying contract
but defining the relevant geographic market for determining
the hospital's market power as the East Bank of Jefferson Par-
ish. The court held that the hospital possessed "sufficient mar-
ket power in th[is] tying market to coerce purchasers of the
tied product."'221 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
court of appeals. Only five of the nine justices found that the
contract was a tying agreement, but all nine concluded that the
contract should be judged by the rule of reason and that the re-
straint was reasonable.
The majority and concurring opinions reveal that the
Supreme Court is sharply divided on the appropriate standard
for judging whether tying arrangements are lawful under the
antitrust laws. Justice Stevens, writing for the five-member
majority, flatly stated that "[i]t is far too late in the history of
our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that cer-
tain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling
competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se.' "222 The
majority opinion primarily focused on identifying the "certain"
tying arrangements that are subject to the per se rule. In con-
trast, Justice O'Connor, writing for the four concurring justices,
asserted that "[t]he time has . ..come to abandon the 'per se'
label and refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic effects,
217. Id at 1554.
218. Id
219. See Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp. 532, 541
(E.D. La. 1981), rev'd, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'ld, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
220. See Hyde, 513 F. Supp. at 542-43.
221. See Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286, 291
(5th Cir. 1982), rev'd 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
222. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1556 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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and the potential economic benefits, that the tie may have." M
The concurrence concentrated on justifying its accusation that
the per se doctrine is merely a "label" and on attacking applica-
tion of even the semblance of a per se rule.z2 4 Neither the ma-
jority nor the concurrence, however, was entirely successful in
its attempt to establish a coherent test for judging the legality
of tying arrangements.
The majority began its attempt at clarification by noting.
Our cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an
invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control
over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied
product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have pre-
ferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.m
The buyer is thus forced to act differently from a buyer in a
competitive market, and competition is correspondingly re-
strained.2 6 Only when "forcing is probable," stated the Court,
223. See id. at 1570 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehn-
quist, JJ., concurring).
224. Justice O'Connor summarized her view of the law of tying
agreements:
The "per se" doctrine in tying cases has thus always required an
elaborate inquiry into the economic effects of the tying arrangement.
As a result, tying doctrine incurs the costs of a rule of reason ap-
proach without achieving its benefits: the doctrine calls for the exten-
sive and time-consuming economic analysis characteristic of the rule
of reason, but then may be interpreted to prohibit arrangements that
economic analysis would show to be beneficial. Moreover, the per se
label in the tying context has generated more confusion than coherent
law because it appears to invite lower courts to omit the analysis of
economic circumstances of the tie that has always been an necessary
element of tying analysis.
Id (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring).
225. 104 S. Ct. at 1558. The majority restated this point in various ways. It
noted that the Court has "condemned tying arrangements when the seller has
some special ability-usually called 'market power'-to force a purchaser to do
something that he would not do in a competitive market. ... When 'forcing'
occurs, our cases have found the tying arrangement to be unlawful." See id. at
1559. The Court explained that its use of the term "forcing" is synonymous
with the term "leverage." See ici at 1559 n.20. 'Leverage" was defined as "'a
supplier's ability [sic] to induce his customer for one product to buy a second
product from him that would not otherwise be purchased solely on the merit
of that second product."' Id. (quoting 5 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST
LAW I 1134a, at 202 (1980)).
226. As the Court explained. "And from the standpoint of the consumer-
whose interests the statute was especially intended to serve-the freedom to
select the best bargains in the second market is impaired by his need to
purchase the tying product, and perhaps by an inability to evaluate the true
cost of either product when they are available only as a package." Id. at 1559-
60 (footnote omitted). Professor Richard Craswell elaborated-
It also is possible, however, for information imperfections to lead to
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is "[p]er se condemnation . . . appropriate. ' 227 To illustrate
such a situation, the Court gave the classic example of a seller
who ties a product that is covered by a patent or similar monop-
oly to another product. In this situation, the seller is presumed
to have the market power necessary to force the buyer to
undesirable outcomes even when buyers know beforehand exactly
what they are getting. This seemingly paradoxical result arises be-
cause, for a market to work efficiently, buyers must be informed
about more than just the offer of the seller they ultimately choose.
They must also be adequately informed about the offers of competing
sellers, so that they can properly compare the two.
... [For example, i]t is by now fairly well-known that sellers
tend to engage in less price competition where buyers have difficulty
making price comparisons. If it is difficult to observe and compare
the prices of competing sellers, a reduction in price will not attract as
many buyers-nor will an increase drive as many away---as where
comparative price information is widely available. Each seller thus
will face a downward-sloping demand curve, and the equilibrium price
will be above the competitive level even in an unconcentrated mar-
ket ....
A similar problem can arise where buyers can easily compare
competitors' prices, but have difficulty comparing the quality of the
product....
This analysis applies to tying arrangements as well. Indeed, the
number and nature of tying requirements that a seller insists on can
be viewed as a dimension of the quality of that seller's offer. If con-
sumers are not fully sensitive to the expected costs or quality of dif-
ferent tying arrangements, then the seller who insists on additional or
more burdensome requirements will not lose as much business as
ideally he should, while the seller who reduces the number of burden-
some requirements will not gain as much business. This distortion
will eventually lead to an equilibrium in which all sellers offer an ex-
cessive number of costly tying requirements. Competition over price
may still keep any seller from earning monopolistic profits, but there
will be no similar competition to eliminate the tying requirements
themselves.
Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protec-
tion Issues, 62 B.U.L. REv. 661, 675-78 (1982) (footnotes omitted); see also
Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1560 n.24 (summarizing Craswell's argument).
227. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1560 (footnote omitted). The Court subse-
quently stated, however, in the very same paragraph:
Of course, as a threshold matter there must be a substantial potential
for impact on competition in order to justify per se condemnation. If
only a single purchaser were "forced" with respect to the purchase of
a tied item, the resultant impact on competition would not be suffi-
cient to warrant the concern of antitrust law. It is for this reason that
we have refused to condemn tying arrangements unless a substantial
volume of commerce is foreclosed thereby .... Similarly, when a
purchaser is 'forced" to buy a product he would not have otherwise
bought even from another in the tied product market, there can be no
adverse impact on competition because no portion of the market
which would otherwise have been available to other sellers has been
foreclosed.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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purchase both products because the tying product is not avail-
able elsewhere. Thus, forcing is likely, and the tying agree-
ment is unlawful per se.228
The Court's examples, however, were not all so straightfor-
ward. The Court went on to observe that a seller's "high" mar-
ket share or its "unique" tying product also invokes the per se
rule.229 The opinion did not explain why the seller of a
"unique" product does not necessarily also have a "high" mar-
ket share, thus implying that the two conditions refer to differ-
ent market conditions. That these qualities are distinct is
clarified by the Court's concluding sentence in its attempt to ra-
tionalize the law of tying arrangements:
When, however, the seller does not have either the degree or the kind
of market power that enables him to force customers to purchase a
second, unwanted product in order to obtain the tying product, an
antitrust violation can be established only by evidence of an unreason-
able restraint on competition in the relevant market. 0
The Court, therefore, identified at least three situations in
which a tying arrangement is unlawful per se: when the tying
product is patented or protected by some other legal monopoly;
when the seller has a "high" share of the market in the tying
product; and when the tying product is "unique."
The majority then attempted to apply these rules to the
case at hand. It first considered whether the defendant was
selling two separate products that could be tied together rather
than, as the hospital contended, "a functionally integrated
package of services."'21 The Court observed that the test
"turns not on the functional relationship between" the two
products "hut rather on the character of the demand" for
them.232 Because consumers purchased anesthesiological serv-
228. See id.
229. See id. at 1560-61.
230. Id. at 1561 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
231. See id at 1561-62 (footnote omitted).
232. See id. at 1562. As the Court explaine&
[Our] cases make it clear that a tying arrangement cannot exist unless
two separate product markets have been linked.
The requirement that two distinguishable product markets be in-
volved follows from the underlying rationale of the rule against ty-
ing... The answer to the question whether [East Jefferson] ha[s]
utilized a tying arrangement must be based on whether there is a pos-
sibility that the economic effect of the arrangement is that con-
demned by the rule against tying-that [East Jefferson] ha[s]
foreclosed competition on the merits in a product market distinct
from the market for the tying item. Thus, in this case no tying ar-
rangement can exist unless there is a sufficient demand for the
purchase of anesthesiological services separate from hospital services
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ices separately from hospital services, the Court found that
East Jefferson's contract with Roux & Associates was a tying
arrangement.23
3
The Court's next step was to determine whether the hospi-
tal "forced" unwanted anesthesiology services on its patients.
Hyde argued that the Jefferson Parish residents' preference for
East Jefferson, the closest hospital, demonstrated the hospital's
dominance in the tying product.234 The Court noted, however,
that seventy percent of these residents entered other hospitals
and that East Jefferson's control of the Jefferson Parish mar-
ket therefore did not "establish the kind of dominant market
position that obviates the need for further inquiry into actual
competitive conditions. ' 235 The Court concluded that "[t]ying
arrangements need only be condemned if they restrain compe-
tition on the merits by forcing purchases that would not other-
wise be made. . . . It is safe to assume that every patient
undergoing a surgical operation needs the services of an anes-
thesiologist; at least this record contains no evidence that the
hospital 'forced' any such services on unwilling patients. ' 23 6
Because it was unable to find evidence of forcing, the Court
found the per se rule inapplicable to East Jefferson's tying con-
tract.2 37 It therefore proceeded to analyze the arrangement
under the "rule of reason" to discover whether Dr. Hyde had
met his burden of proving that the tie had any actual adverse
effect on competition.238 Finding no evidence that "any patient
to identify a distinct product market in which it is efficient to offer
anesthesiological services separately from hospital services.
Id at 1562-63 (footnotes omitted).
233. See id at 1564-65.
234. See id at 1566.
235. See id.
236. See id at 1566-67 (footnote omitted). The Court rejected the conten-
tion that the "market imperfections" that allowed East Jefferson to charge
noncompetitive prices constituted "forcing." Justice Stevens explained:
A lack of price or quality competition does not create this type of forc-
ing [warranting per se treatment]. If consumers lack price conscious-
ness, that fact will not force them to take an anesthesiologist whose
services they do not want-their indifference to price will have no im-
pact on their willingness or ability to go to another hospital where
they can utilize the services of the anesthesiologist of their choice.
Similarly, if consumers cannot evaluate the quality of anesthesiologi-
cal services, it follows that they are indifferent between certified an-
esthesiologists even in the absence of a tying arrangement-such an
arrangement cannot be said to have foreclosed a choice that would
have otherwise been made "on the merits."
Id at 1566.




... was not.., able to go to a hospital that would provide him
with the anesthesiologist of his choice,"239 the Court concluded
that no showing of such an adverse effect had been made. 0
Although the Court conceded in a footnote that competition at
East Jefferson Hospital was eliminated by the contractUl it
stated that this elimination, "[l]ike any exclusive requirements
contract," was "unlawful if it foreclosed so much of the market
... as to unreasonably restrain competition in... the market
for anesthesiological services.... [R]espondent has not at-
tempted to make this showing."m
The majority opinion in Hyde raises a host of unanswered
questions about the factors needed to invoke the per se rule.243
First, the Court stated that the hospital's market power or
"dominance" is "far from overwhelming" because seventy per-
cent of the patients residing near it chose to go to other hospi-
tals.2 44 In antitrust jargon, this could mean that the
defendant's share of the relevant geographic market in the ty-
ing product was only thirty percent. Read in conjunction with
the Court's earlier discussion of the "tests" for applying the per
se doctrine,2 this holding might indicate that a larger percent-
age would have met the Court's definition of a "high" market
share and therefore would have triggered per se treatment of
the contract. The question then becomes, of course, how much
larger than thirty percent is "high."
An additional uncertainty in the Court's apparent attempt
to identify what is not a 'igh" market share can be illustrated
by considering a situation in which there are ten hospitals
within the relevant geographic market, each of which provides
approximately ten percent of the hospital services in the mar-
ket. Further suppose that each hospital has an exclusive ar-
rangement with an organization of anesthesiologists like that
239. See id at 1568 (footnote omitted).
240. See id.
241. See id. at 1568 n.51.
242. See id.
243. For example, it is difficult to reconcile Justice Stevens's assertion that
tying arrangements must be condemned because they force consumers to buy
products they did not want, see supra text accompanying note 225, with his
statement three paragraphs later that "when a purchaser is 'forced' to buy a
product he would not have otherwise bought... ,there can be no adverse im-
pact on competition because no portion of the market which would otherwise
have been available to other sellers has been foreclosed," see Hyde, 104 S. Ct.
at 1560; supra note 227.
244. See Hyde, 104 S. CL at 1566; supra text accompanying note 235.
245. See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
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which East Jefferson had with Roux. A qualified anesthesiolo-
gist consequently cannot practice within the market unless in-
vited to join one of the ten groups holding an exclusive
arrangement with a hospital. Although the market is therefore
closed to independents, the agreements could arguably escape
per se condemnation under Hyde because each hospital falls be-
low Hyde's thirty percent benchmark and thus does not have a
"high" market share. If so, the agreements would be lawful
under Hyde unless the plaintiff anesthesiologist can prove that
they are unreasonable. The question then becomes what evi-
dence is necessary to prove that they are unreasonable. 246
The opinion can also be read as holding that consumers of
hospital surgical services-patients-are rarely, if ever,
"forced" to accept the services of anesthesiologists because they
are ignorant and indifferent as to the services' quality.247 Ac-
cording to this interpretation of the opinion, the per se doctrine
would arguably be inapplicable no matter how high the hospi-
tal's market share because forcing is unlikely to occur even
when one hospital controls the entire market. The Court, how-
ever, acknowledged that surgeons can and do evaluate anesthe-
siologists,2 8 and no reasoning supports the assumption that
every surgeon who operated at East Jefferson wanted Roux an-
esthesiologists and no others.2 9 Yet surgeons were required to
use Roux unless the patient was moved to another hospital. It
appears almost certain that some surgeons were "forced" to use
Roux & Associates, at least when no other hospital was conve-
246. Presumably, if one hospital in the relevant geographic market has
over 50% of that market and has an exclusive arrangement with a group of
anesthesiologists like East Jefferson Hospital's arrangement with Roux, the
majority of five would hold this arrangement to be per se unlawful because
the hospital is dominant or has a monopoly. Cf. McMorris v. Williamsport
Hospital, 597 F. Supp. 899, 913 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (refusing to grant the hospital's
motion for summary judgment on a Sherman Act challenge to its exclusive
contract with a provider of nuclear medicine because of evidence that "The
Williamsport Hospital possessed a 55-60% of the market share with respect to
diagnostic nuclear medicine procedures[,] ... certain procedures are per-
formed only at the Williamsport Hospital ... and.., the hospital's share in
the market for therapeutic procedures has increased from 47.4% to 100%") (ci-
tations omitted).
247. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1566-67; supra note 236.
248. Cf. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1568 n.52 ("Moreover, the self interest of the
hospital, as well as the ethical and professional norms under which it operates,
presumably protect the quality of anesthesiological services.") (citation
omitted).
249. Cf. id at 1567-68 ("The evidence indicates that some surgeons and pa-
tients preferred [Dr. Hyde's] services to those of Roux . . ").
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nient.2 0 In these circumstances, some "forcing" within the
terms of the majority opinion must have occurred, unless "forc-
ing" requires physical coercion.
A further difficulty with the opinion's articulation of the
per se rule in tying arrangements is the meaning the Court
gave to the term "unique."251 The majority seemed to indicate
that the railroad's land holdings in Northern Pacific25 were
"unique," stating that the land "gave the railroad a unique kind
of bargaining power that enabled it to tie the sales of that land
to exclusive, long term commitments that fenced out competi-
tion in the transportation market over a protracted period."2
As stressed in Northern Pacific itself, persons who farmed in
the vicinity of Northern Pacific's lands often found it necessary
to buy or lease the railroad's land because it adjoined their
property and "was frequently essential to their business activi-
ties."2- Applying this analysis to the facts in Hyde, many of
East Jefferson Hospital's patients used the hospital that was
nearest their homes2 for the same reason that the farmers in
Northern Pacific bought or leased the railroad's adjoining
lands-necessity. One could conclude, therefore, that East Jef-
ferson's hospital services had a "unique" quality for these pa-
tients that was similar to the unique attributes the railroad's
land had for the neighboring farmers. The majority, however,
never discussed whether the hospital's services might be consid-
ered "unique", thus leaving its definition of the term unknown.
The majority's discussion of the rule of reason as applied to
Dr. Hyde's case also raises issues similar to those generated by
its discussion of the per se rule. The opinion indicates that a
plaintiff bringing a tying case under the rule of reason must de-
fine the market and demonstrate "the actual effect of the ex-
250. Cf. id at 1568 n.50 ("If, as is likely, it is the patient's doctor and not
the patient who selects an anesthesiologist, the doctor can simply take the pa-
tient elsewhere if he is dissatisfied with Roux. The District Court found that
most doctors in the area have staff privileges at more than one hopsital.") (ci-
tation omitted) (emphasis added).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 228-30.
252. 356 U.S. 1 (1958); see supr notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
253. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1561 (footnote omitted).
254. See Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 7; see also id. at 18 n.4 ("[Certain land-
holdings of [Northern Pacific], particularly grazing lands, were in a checker-
board pattern among private holdings, thereby giving [Northern Pacific] a
strategic position with respect to those lands since the private landholders
often found it necessary to acquire [Northern Pacific's] lands to fill gaps in ex-
isting ranges.") (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter and Whittaker, JJ., dis-
senting).
255. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1555-56, 1566.
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clusive contract on competition among" sellers of the tied
products.. 6 The opinion then cites "generally"2 57 Standard Oil
Co. v. United States (Standard Stations)25 8 and Tampa Electric
Co v. Nashville Coal Co.2 9
Standard Stations, decided in 1949, held that any exclusive
dealing arrangement that forecloses a substantial percentage of
the market is illegal per se.260 Although the 1961 opinion in
Tampa Electric did not purport to overrule Standard Stations,
it did suggest that more than proof of foreclosure of a substan-
tial percentage of the market may be required to establish the
illegality of the arrangement:
To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to
weigh the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effec-
tive competition, taking into account the relative strength of the par-
ties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the
total volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the prob-
able immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of
the market might have on effective competition therein.
2 6 1
The Hyde majority may be indicating that similar evidence
must be introduced to measure the actual effect of tying ar-
rangements not meeting the Court's current per se rule.
Curiously, the Hyde opinion also stated in a footnote that
the Roux "contract could be unlawful if it foreclosed so much
of the market from penetration by Roux's competitors as to un-
reasonably restrain competition in the affected market, the
market for anesthesiological services. '2 62 The Court apparently
meant that Hyde had only to define the affected geographical
market and show that the hospital controlled a certain percent-
age of anesthesiological services in that market to prevail under
256. See id. at 1567; see also id. at 1568 n.51.
257. See id. at 1568 n.51.
258. 337 U.S. 293 (1949); see supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
259. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
260. See supra text accompanying note 143.
261. Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 329.
262. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1568 n.51 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Unlawful foreclosure of competitors may be proved without any proof that
price or quality have been adversely affected, in other words, without proof
that consumers have been hurt. Cf. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 396-97 (1947) (holding International Salt's lease provisions to be inva-
lid even though consumers were not adversely affected); supra note 122. Ad-
herents to the Chicago School criticize cases emphasizing "the welfare of
competitors rather than consumers" because of "the consumer-oriented view
of antitrust that prevails today." See Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1495 (7th Cir. 1983), aqffd on other




the rule of reason. This test appears to be more like the per se
rule applied in Standard Stations than it is like the test ad-
vanced by Tampa Electric. The majority's test, however, raises
a question similar to that suggested by the Court's conclusion
that the seller's "high" market share in the tying product in-
vokes the per se doctrine:26 how large a market share must
the seller have in the tied product for the arrangement to be
held unlawful under the rule of reason or, in other words, how
much is "so much"?
The concurrence in Hyde disagreed with almost everything
important in the Court's opinion except the result. It charac-
terized the majority's "per se" analysis as no per se doctrine at
all, but rather a disguised rule of reason requiring an "elaborate
inquiry into... economic effects."264 It then described the ma-
jority's conclusion that patents, a "high" market share, and a
"unique" product all demonstrate market power as a "common
misconception."2 Considering the facts in Hyde, the concur-
ring opinion asserted that the Roux contract was not a tying ar-
rangement at all.25 Even assuming a tying arrangement
existed, the opinion stated, it was not unlawful because the ar-
263. See supra text accompanying notes 243-46.
264. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1570 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Pow-
ell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring); supra note 224.
265. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1572 n.7 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring). As Justice O'Connor explained-
While each of these three factors might help to give market power to
a seller, it is also possible that a seller in these situations will have no
market power- for example, a patent holder has no market power in
any relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented prod-
uct. Similarly, a high market share indicates market power only if
the market is properly defined to include all reasonable substitutes
for the product.
Id. (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concur-
ring) (citation omitted).
266. The concurring opinion asserted-
[Tihere is no sound economic reason for treating surgery and anesthe-
sia as separate services. Patients are interested in purchasing anesthe-
sia only in conjunction with hospital services, so the Hospital can
acquire no additional market power by selling the two services to-
gether. Accordingly, the link between the Hospital's Services and an-
esthesia administered by Roux will affect neither the amount of
anesthesia provided nor the combined price of anesthesia and surgery
for those who choose to become the Hospital's patients. In these cir-
cumstances, anesthesia and surgical services should probably not be
characterized as distinct products for tying purposes.
id. at 1574-75 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring); see also id. at 1572-73 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Pow-
ell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
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rangement had "little potential to harm the patients."2 67 The
four concurring justices further argued for a balancing test in
which a tying arrangement could be condemned "only when its
anticompetitive impact outweighs its contribution to
efficiency. '26
8
Like the majority opinion, the concurrence has its perplex-
ities. The concurring opinion concluded that the Roux contract
was not a tying arrangement because "[t]here is no sound eco-
nomic reason for treating surgery and anesthesia as separate
services.1269 Even if the arrangement is a tie, stated the concur-
rence, it is unlikely to injure patients because "very few pa-
tients will choose to undergo surgery without receiving
anesthesia." 270 Regardless of whether this observation refers to
economic or physical harm, however, it has no relevance in an
examination of the validity of the Roux contract under the an-
titrust laws. In enacting section 3 of the Clayton Act, Congress
condemned tying arrangements that might "lessen competi-
tion.1271 It made no mention of their effect on consumers. In-
stead, Congress assumed that consumers would benefit by the
preservation of competition. Thus, in International Business
Machines Corp. v. United States,272 the Supreme Court was not
deterred from invalidating IBM's requirement that only IBM
tabulating cards be used with its tabulating machines by the
fact that no one would have used the machines without some
make of tabulating cards. In Hyde, the patients undoubtedly
required anesthesia before surgery, but this observation is irrel-
evant in an analysis of whether East Jefferson could require
that Roux anesthesiologists be used.
The concurring opinion also stated that the rule of reason
requires a decision as to whether the "anticompetitive impact"
of the tying arrangement "outweighs its contribution to effi-
267. See id at 1575 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehn-
quist, JJ., concurring).
268. See id. at 1574 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehn-
quist, JJ., concurring) (emphasis added).
269. See id. (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist,
JJ., concurring).
270. See id. at 1575 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehn-
quist, JJ., concurring). Consequently, "tying here cannot increase the seller's
already absolute power over the volume of production of the tied product." Id.
(O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 30-55.
272. 298 U.S. 131 (1936); see supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
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ciency." -3 The method by which this weighing process is to be
conducted is a mystery not clarified by the opinion. As an ex-
ample of the confusion generated by this balancing approach,
suppose that the evidence in Hyde had shown that the Roux
contract lowered total hospital costs by one percent and surgi-
cal costs by a larger percentage. It simply is impossible to
"weigh" this hypothetical evidence against hypothetical proof
that, for example, Roux had used no new anesthesia in obstet-
rics cases for two years despite use of such innovations by anes-
thesiologists in other hospitals. This balancing is analogous to
deciding whether a particular rose smells as sweet as a specified
ripe peach tastes and, therefore, as then-Professor Frank H.
Easterbrook persuasively argued, leaves the rule of reason
without any content.274
The concurring opinion's balancing test further ignores
both the Court's strong line of precedent invalidating tying ar-
273. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1574 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Pow-
ell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring); supra text accompanying note 268.
274. See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 153-57 (discussing the impossibility
of applying an open-ended weighing formula).
Justice O'Connor also stated that the contract between East Jefferson and
Roux was "unquestionably" an "exclusive dealing" contract. See Hyde, 104 S.
Ct. at 1575 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring). Here the opinion abruptly shifted to the effect of the arrange-
ment on competition rather than on consumers: "Dr. Hyde... and other hos-
pitals in the area ... may have grounds to complain that the exclusive
contract stifles horizontal competition and therefore has an adverse, albeit in-
direct, impact on consumer welfare even if it is not a tie." Id. (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring). Nevertheless,
the concurrers concluded, because the exclusive dealing arrangement "fore-
closes only a small fraction of the market in which anesthesiologists may sell
their services, and a still smaller fraction of the market in which hospitals may
secure anesthesiological services[, t]he contract therefore survives scrutiny
under the Rule of Reason." See id. at 1576 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger,
C.J., Powell and Rehnquist JJ., concurring). As far as exclusive dealing is
concerned, the four concurring justices apparently agree with the majority of
five, see 104 S. Ct. at 1568 n.51; supra text accompanying notes 241-42, and rely
on a doctrine many had regarded as outmoded-that of "quantitative substan-
tiality," enunciated over 35 years ago in Standard Stations, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
See supra text accompanying notes 132-43; cf. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser In-
dus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 394 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[A] plaintiff must prove two things
to show that an exclusive-dealing agreement is unreasonable. First, he must
prove that it is likely to keep at least one significant competitor of the defend-
ant from doing business in a relevant market. If there is no exclusion of a sig-
nificant competitor, the agreement cannot possibly harm competition. Second,
he must prove that the probable (not certain) effect of the exclusion will be to
raise prices above (and therefore reduce output below) the competitive level,
or otherwise injure competition; he must show in other words that the an-




rangements that have an adverse effect on competition and the
congressional intent expressed in the 1914 debates leading to
the adoption of section 3 of the Clayton Act. As Hyde's major-
ity opinion stated:
[T]he proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unaccept-
able risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable "per
se".. . was first enunciated in International Salt Co. v. United States,
... and has been endorsed by this Court [nine] times since. The rule
also reflects congressional policies underlying the antitrust laws. In
enacting § 3 of the Clayton Act, . . .Congress expressed great con-
cern about the anticompetitive character of tying arrangements....
While this case does not arise under the Clayton Act, the congres-
sional finding . .. concerning the competitive consequences of tying
... must be respected. 2 7 5
The concurrence, however, was not persuaded by this
showing of precedents and congressional policy. By urging that
a tying arrangement's "contribution to efficiency" can outweigh
its "anticompetitive impact," the concurrence seeks instead to
resurrect the law of tying arrangements existing in 1918, when
Justice McKenna stated in United Shoe 1276 that the lessees en-
tered into shoe machinery leases containing tying clauses "upon
a calculation of their value-the efficiency of the machines bal-
anced against the restrictions upon and conditions of their use.
The lessees had the alternative of the choice of other ma-
chines . . . . 7 It should not be forgotten, however, that the
majority in Hyde was also guilty of ignoring precedent. The
opinion abandoned Standard Station's2 7 dictum 279 and silently
overruled Northern Pacific,280 both of which came close to stat-
ing that all tying arrangements are unlawful if they affect a not
insubstantial amount of interstate commerce. 2sl
275. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1556-58 (citations and footnotes omitted).
276. 247 U.S. 32 (1918); see supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
277. See United Shoe , 247 U.S. at 65; supra text accompanying note 77.
278. 337 U.S. 293 (1949); see supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
279. See Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 305-06; supra text accompanying
note 140.
280. 356 U.S. 1 (1958); see supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
281. Hyde's reinterpretation of precedent has, of course, changed the law of
tying arrangements. The precise impact of Hyde, however, is as yet uncertain.
Compare Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (9th Cir.)
("In [Hyde] the Supreme Court again made it clear that a tying arrangement
is illegal per so if the seller of the tying product has the capacity to force some
buyers to purchase a tied product they do not want or would have preferred to
purchase elsewhere."), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 27,
1984) with Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 702
(7th Cir.) ('The Supreme Court's most recent tying decision requires the
plaintiff to [show that the defendant has market power] in order to prove that
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Thus, in Hyde the Supreme Court has taken another swing
in judicial attitude on the validity of tying arrangements.ma
Several reasons can be advanced to explain this change in atti-
tude, the most obvious of which is the change in the Court's
composition over the last decade and a half. Only three of the
justices sitting when Fortner I was decided remain on the
Court. New members have brought different ideas on the
legitimate objectives of antitrust law.284 As early as 1974, the
a tying arrangement is unlawful, even though tying still is referred to as a per
se offense.") (citing Hyde), i'ert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 432 (1984).
282. This tidal, or ebb and flow, phenomenon has been most dear, not to
say dramatic, in the development of the per se rule against price fixing. The
literal approach of the Court's early Sherman Act opinion in which it was
written that the Act's "plain language" condemning "every conspiracy" in re-
straint of trade" meant what it said, see United States v. Trans-Missouri
-Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327 (1897); supra note 14, gave way in 1911 to the
rule of reason enunciated in Chief Justice White's opinion in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The rule of reason was further refined and
applied by Justice Brandeis in his opinion for the Court in Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In the 1928 Trenton Potteries opin-
ion, however, the rule of reason gave way to the per se doctrine in which some
restraints (in that case, price fixing) were said to be unreasonable per se, to be
condemned without judicial inquiry into their benefits and detriments. See
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Six years after
Trenton Potteries came Chief Justice Hughes's opinion in Appalachian Coals
in which the per se doctrine was ignored, and a price-fixing scheme by a group
of coal sellers was upheld as reasonable under the Sherman Act, which the
Court described as having a "generality and adaptability comparable to that
found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." See Appalachian Coals, Inc.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933). Seven years later, in 1940, Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, applied a rigorous per se approach to some-
thing less than direct price fixing in the petroleum business. See United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). In 1978, the doctrine was reex-
amined again in Professional Engineers and reaffirmed in an opinion by Jus-
tice Stevens, see National Soc'y of Professional Engrs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679 (1978), only to be thrown in doubt again by the Court's opinion in
Broadcast Music a year later when the rule of reason was applied to a scheme
that the court of appeals said involved "price fixing in the literal sense," see
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.. 1, 8 (1979). Jus-
tice Stevens vigorously dissented.
283. Only Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White were on the Court in
1969 when Fortner I was decided.
284. Members of the Court have occasionally recognized that the opinions
of their colleagues in antitrust cases have been influenced by policy views,
predilections, preconceptions, and biases, not to say prejudices. See, eg.,
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 653 (1974) (White, J.,
joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("In the last analysis, one's
view of this case, and the rule one devises for assessing whether this merger
should be barred, turns on the policy of § 7 of the Clayton Act to bar mergers
which may contribute to further concentration in the structure of American
business.") (citations omitted); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486, 527 (1974) (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.,
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Nixon appointees, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, had com-
prised a new majority that essentially reversed the law relating
to horizontal mergers,285 invalidating Justice Stewart's famous
generalization that the "sole consistency" in merger cases is
that "the Government always wins. ' 286 In 1977, the same ma-
jority expressly overruled a prior antitrust case for the first
time in the Court's history, holding that restrictions on distri-
bution should usually be judged by the rule of reason rather
than by per se rules.287 In that opinion, the Court cited an arti-
cle by then-Professor Posner of the University of Chicago six
times.288 Judge Posner is the preeminent advocate of the doc-
trine that there is but one valid antitrust goal: the promotion
of allocative efficiency.289
In the law of tying arrangements, however, Justice Stevens
has, to some extent, assumed the leadership position vacated by
dissenting) ("On the basis of a record so devoid of findings based on correct
legal standards, the judgment may not be affirmed except on a deep-seated ju-
dicial bias against § 7 of the Clayton Act.").
285. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974);
supra note 194.
286. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stew-
art, J., joined by Harlan, J., dissenting).
287. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977),
overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); see
also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2745 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), which was
overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502, 518 (1917), was not an antitrust case. See supra notes 59-70 and accompa-
nying text. Part of the reason that Supreme Court majorities are so reluctant
to expressly overrule previous opinions may be that they wish to avoid fore-
closing an opposite result in the future.
288. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 48 n.13; id. at 51 n.18; id. at 53 n.21; id.
at 55; id at 56; id. at 56 n.24 (citing Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Po-
tential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975)).
289. For a sampling of Judge Posner's writings on antitrust, see, e.g., R.
POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUsT: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER
MATERIALS (2d ed. 1981); R. POSNER, supra note 4; Landes & Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); Posner, Next Step in
the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 6 (1981); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 925 (1979); Posner, Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Re-
f/ections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977); Posner, The So-
cial Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); Posner,
Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506 (1974);
Posner, Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 500 (1971); Pos-
ner, Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcemen4 13 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1970);




Justice Black in 1971.m Justice Stevens's two tying opinions,
Fortner 11291 and Hyde,29 2 have gone far toward undoing Jus-
tice Black's extension of the law of tying. Nevertheless, Justice
Stevens refused to join the four Republican appointees concur-
ring in Hyde, who would have had the Court return to the rule
of reason as the sole test to be used in any case involving tying
arrangements. 293 Moreover, Justice Stevens thus far has been
able to command a majority for his more moderate position. In
light of his prior involvement in antitrust law,2 Justice Ste-
vens's commitment to fairly vigorous antitrust enforcement is
not apt to diminish significantly in the future.
The changes in the Court's perceptions, however, should
not be attributed solely to changes in the composition of the
Court. There are more subtle influences at work. The public,
for example, appears to perceive that the legal underpinnings
of antitrust have moved too far away from current economic
thought and too close to a doctrine that promotes economic
inefficiency in the name of political democracy.295 Such percep-
290. See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
Justice Stevens is usually described as independent or unconventional,
and he is not seen as aligned with either of the two conventional groupings of
justices on the so-called Burger Court. He was appointed by President Gerald
Ford in late 1975 to succeed Justice Douglas, after having served for five years
on the Seventh Circuit in Chicago. See Orland, John Paul Stevens, in 5 JuS-
TIcES, supra note 64, at 149, 149, 150. Although President Ford is widely re-
garded as a conventional Republican politician, his one Supreme Court
appointment definitely does not support that image. It is widely believed that
President Ford relied on his attorney general, Edward Hirsch Levi, for advice
on the appointment. Id. at 149. '"Levi, in a much praised move, had circulated
a limited list of Supreme Court candidates to the American Bar Association
for screening. This heretofore unprecedented step toward merit selection re-
sulted in unqualified Bar Association praise for Stevens." rd
291. 429 U.S. 610 (1977); see supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
292. 104 U.S. 1551 (1984); see supra notes 211-81 and accompanying text.
293. See Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1570 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Pow-
ell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring); supa text accompanying note 223.
294. Justice Stevens did antitrust work for the government in 195L He
also served on Attorney General Brownell's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws during the mid-1950's and engaged in the private practice of
antitrust law in Chicago. See Orland, John Paul Stevens, in 5 JusTIcES supra
note 64, at 150.
295. This perhaps results primarily from the growth in private treble dam-
age actions which, for the last 20 years or more, have comprised the dominant
antitrust enforcement mechanisn Although lawyers for private antitrust
plaintiffs have been dubbed by sympathetic justices as "private attorneys gen-
eral," see, eg., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134, 147 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring), others view these lawyers as generals
leading private armies dedicated not to principled antitrust enforcement, but
rather to maximization of damages and hence of their legal fees, see Coffee,
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tions can determine the outcome of presidential elections, and
it is presidents who appoint Supreme Court justices.
The shift in the judicial sentiment can also be traced to the
perceptions of scholars and the manner in which they are ex-
pressed. The increasing number of footnotes devoted to citing
scholarly writings296 indicates that the justices at least think
that they are influenced by these works. Nor is it surprising
that the views of those scholars who believe that the promotion
of allocative efficiency is the only legitimate goal of antitrust
law are gaining increasing dominance in public, scholarly, and
judicial thought. These views have not only been widely publi-
cized, they have been expressed with great clarity and with a
force that has matched the writings of great religious
thinkers.297
Thus, as Professor Lawrence A. Sullivan has written,
"Changes and developments in ways of thinking about [anti-
trust] will be correlated with other developments in national
life, as well as with developments in the intellectual universes
of economists and others who may contribute to policy develop-
ment. '298 In this ever-changing world, the debate over the ap-
propriate enforcement of antitrust laws is unlikely to abate; nor
are the changes in the law of tying arrangements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of the law of tying arrangements has been one
of changing tests reflecting changing theories of legitimate ap-
plication of the antitrust laws. The law has evolved through
shifting judicial attitudes, attitudes that sometimes emphasize
the contribution of tying arrangements to efficiency and other
Rescuing the Private Attorney General Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983); see also L. SULLI.
VAN, supra note 1, § 249, at 781-82 ("Lawyers drawn from the establishment
culture represent corporate America. Plaintiffs' class action lawyers are
drawn in substantial numbers, if not predominantly, from the bar's maverick
culture.").
296. Compare, for example, the lack of articles cited in Northern Pac., 356
U.S. 1 (1958), to the overabundance in Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
297. The respect in which economic analysis is held today is remarkable
when one considers that the views of economists historically have been widely
disregarded by both Congress and the courts. Thus, while the Sherman Act
was under consideration in the late 1880's, most influential economists were of
the view that attempts to criminalize and abolish "every ... combination in
the form of trust or otherwise" were either unnecessary, futile, or both. See
supra note 9.
298. L. SUtLLVAN, supra note 1, § 2, at 12.
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times insist that other values, such as preservation of competi-
tion, control. It cannot be denied that the Supreme Court opin-
ions developing antitrust law have been principled; the
difficulty is that two sets of principles, each at war with the
other, exist at any given moment. The law pronounced by the
Court depends on which principle reaches the result that, to
the majority, seems most just, fair, reasonable, or workable.
In its most recent resolution of a tying case, Jefferson Par-
ish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,2 the Supreme Court
shifted the direction of the law of tying arrangements. This di-
rection, however, is not new to the Court but instead was the
law in 1947 when the Court decided International Salt Co. v.
United States.300 Nor is the direction urged by the concurrence
in Hyde new; it was the law in 1918 when the Court decided
United Shoe 1.3°1
Today's debate between advocates of allocative efficiency
and those who insist that other factors must enter into the
equation reflects arguments that have been voiced in the
Supreme Court throughout the history of tying arrangements.
This debate has also entered into other branches of antitrust
law. For example, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co.,302 the Court declared resale price-fixing contracts
void as against public policy. Justice Holmes stated in dissent-
Mhe most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their
own business in their own way, unless the ground for interference is
very clear.... I think that we greatly exaggerate the value and im-
portance to the public of competition in the production or distribution
of an article .... as fixing a fair price. What really fixes that is the
competition of conflicting desires .... As soon as the price of some-
thing that we want goes above the point at which we are willing to
give up other things to have that, we cease to buy it and buy some-
thing else.... [The point of the most profitable returns marks the
equilibrium of social desires and determines the fair price in the only
sense in which I can find meaning in those words. The Dr. Miles
Medical Company knows better than we do what will enable it to do
the best business.... I cannot believe that in the long run the public
will profit by this court permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for
some ulterior purpose of their own and thus to impair, if not to de-
stroy, the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to be de-
sirable that the public should be able to geL303
299. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984); see supra Part HI.
300. 332 U.S. 392 (1947); see supra notes 120-26, 212-14, 278-81, and accom-
panying text
30L 247 U.S. 32 (1918); see supra notes 71-80,215,276-77, and accompanying
text
302. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
303. Id. at 411-12 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Efficiency arguments run
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Justice Holmes's arguments, now almost seventy-five years
old, include some of the same points being made by members of
the Chicago School in favor of abolishing the per se rule against
vertical price fixing.3° The arguments made today by those op-
posing the Chicago School were also voiced in early Supreme
throughout Justice Holmes's opinions. Thus, in his dissent in American Col-
umn & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), Justice Holmes
stressed the advantages in having competitors exchange price information,
arguing,
[T]he Sherman Act did not set itself against knowledge--did not aim
at a transitory cheapness unprofitable to the community as a whole
because not corresponding to the actual conditions of the country. I
should have thought that the ideal of commerce was an intelligent in-
terchange made with full knowledge of the facts as a basis for a fore-
cast of the future on both sides.
Id at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Almost 60 years later, then-Professor Pos-
ner put his stamp of approval on Justice Holmes's dissent in American Col-
umn & Lumber, assuring students of antitrust that Holmes had "grasped" the
economics of competitors' exchanges of price and information. See Posner, In-
formation and Antitrust- Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions,
67 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1196 (1979). Professor Posner concluded with the following
suggestion:
Consider the exchange of information to be a lawful practice under
section 1 of the Sherman Act regardless of the level of concentration
or other factors; but, when appropriate, allow the trier of fact to con-
sider exchanges of information, other communications among the par-
ties to an alleged conspiracy, and such other relevant circumstances as
the effect on the price level as distinct from the change in the disper-
sion of prices, as circumstantial evidence of alleged price fixing.
I& at 1203.
Similarly, in Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), Jus-
tice Holmes wrote:
There is a natural feeling that somehow or other the [Sherman Act]
meant to strike at combinations great enough to cause just anxiety on
the part of those who love their country more than money, while it
viewed ... little ones ... with just indifference. This notion, it may
be said, somehow breathes from the pores of the act, although it
seems to be contradicted in every way by the words in detail....
But ... [, i]n the first place size in the case of railroads is an inevita-
ble incident .... In the next place in the case of railroads it is evi-
dent that the size of the combination is reached for other ends than
those which would make them monopolies. The combinations are not
formed for the purpose of excluding others from the field. Finally,
even a small railroad will have the same tendency to exclude others
from its narrow area that great ones have to exclude others from a
greater one, and the staute attacks the small monopolies as well as
the great.
Id at 407-08 (Holmes, J., joined by Fuller, C.J., White and Peckham, JJ.,
dissenting).
304. In a recent article, then-Professor Easterbrook virtually parroted Jus-
tice Holmes's argument:
I want to dispatch a line of argument one hears too often in political
discourse. It is that restricted dealing, and especially resale price
[Vol. 69:10131068
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Court opinions. For example, in his opinion in United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Association,305 Justice Peckham stated:
[I]t is not material that the price of an article be lowered. It is in the
power of the combination to raise it, and the result in any event is un-
fortunate for the country by depriving it of the services of a large
number of small but independent dealers who were familiar with the
business and who had spent their lives in it, and who supported them-
selves and their families from the small profits realized therein.
Whether they be able to find other avenues to earn their livelihood is
not so material, because it is not for the real prosperity of any country
that such changes should occur which result in transferring an in-
dependent business man, the head of his establishment, small though
it might be, into a mere servant or agent of a corporation for selling
the commodities which he once manufactured or dealt in, having no
voice in shaping the business policy of the company and bound to obey
orders issued by others.3° 6
maintenance, is bad because it enables manufacturers to jack up the
retail price of its products. So it does....
So what? If Russell Stoever wants its chocolates to sell for $20
per pound, it can achieve this easily enough. It may raise the whole-
sale prices.... Every manufacturer may sell what it wants and
charge what the traffic will bear. Other manufacturers, perhaps using
less chocolate per pound or employing more efficient manufacturing,
may sell different goods and charge less. This is competition. Con-
sumers will choose. The question is whether restricted dealing affects
price in an anticompetitive way. If manufacturers may affect retail
prices by changing wholesale prices or quality, why may they not af-
fect prices through restricted dealing?
Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 141 (emphasis in original); see also R. BOM
supra note 3, at 297 ("[Vertical price fixing [is] beneficial to consumers and
should for that reason be completely lawful. Basic economic theory tells us
that the manufacturer who imposes such restraints cannot intend to restrict
output and must ... intend to create efficiency. The most common efficiency
is the inducement or purchase by the manufacturer of extra reseller sales, ser-
vice, or promotional effort."); IL POSNER, supra note 4, at 148-51 (suggesting
that vertical price fixing may induce dealers to provide an optimum level of
presale services).
305. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
306. I at 324. Similarly, the first Justice Harlan, writing the opinion of
the Court in Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), refuted a
charge that is still heard today. He wrote:
Disaster to business and wide-spread financial ruin, it has been inti-
mated, will follow the execution of [the Sherman Act's] provisions
Such predictions were made in all the cases heretofore arising under
that act But they have not been verified. It is the history of monopo-
lies in this country and in England that predictions of ruin are habitu-
ally made by them when it is attempted, by legislation, to restrain
their operations and to protect the public against their exactions....
In this, as in former cases, they seek shelter behind ... the constitu-
tional guaranty of liberty of contract. But this court has theretofore
adjudged that ... liberty of contract did not involve a right to deprive





Thus, much of the ideological support for recent changes in
the law of tying arrangements and in other areas of antitrust
law are not new but instead were considered-sometimes ac-
cepted, and sometimes rejected-by Supreme Court majorities
in the past. Moreover, it is perhaps more important that these
ideas were also considered by the congresses that enacted the
antitrust laws. Evidently, Santayana was wrong in his famous
aphorism, because the Court, having studied the past, neverthe-
less seems determined to repeat it, at least in the law of tying
arrangements.3 07
307. See G. SANTAYANA, Reason in Common Sense, in 1 THE LIFE OF REA-
SON 284 (1905) ('"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to re-
peat it.").
1070 [Vol. 69:1013
